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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ELECTROL PARTICIPATION IN 
TURKISH NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS 
 
 
Burcu Çulhaoğlu 
 
 
M.A Political Science 
Spring 2007 
Thesis Advisor: Ali Çarkoğlu 
 
Keywords: Turkey, electoral participation, rational choice theory, national and local 
elections, regression  
 
  
 Previously, studies on electoral participation rate have mainly focused on the 
voter turnout in the national elections and analyzed the determinants that are expected to 
be effective on the voter turnout were analyzed at individual, cross-sectional and nation-
wide level. In these studies, the other forms of elections are only examined in terms of 
their relationship with national elections. 
 
This thesis study, examined the electoral participation rate in local elections as a 
dependent variable, in addition to that of national elections, and created a dataset 
encompassing both national and two forms of local elections: namely the mayor of 
municipality and the members of provincial council elections. In the first regression 
equation, the impacts of the socioeconomic variables and institutional setting variables 
on the voter turnout in 1977 and 1999 national and local elections are tested at a 
provincial-level. In the second and main regression model, the influence of party system 
variables on the electoral participation in Turkish national and local elections since 
1950 is also tested at a nation-wide level by using aggregate data.  
 
Appropriate statistical tests covey results that mostly support the expectations 
about the influences of structural socio-economic and institutional factors upon turnout 
in local as well as the national elections.  
 
Both regression models indicated that application of compulsory voting is the 
single most important determinant for an increase in voter turnout. In contrast to the 
rational choice theory assumptions, in Turkey as the economic conditions improve the 
electoral participation in Turkish national and local elections decreases.  
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ÖNSÖZ 
 
 
TÜRKİYE’DEKİ GENEL VE YEREL SEÇİMLERDE SEÇMEN KATILIMI 
 
 
Burcu Çulhaoğlu 
 
 
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Bahar 2007 
Tez Danışmanı: Ali Çarkoğlu 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Türkiye, seçim katılım oranı, rasyonel seçim teorisi, genel ve yerel 
seçimler, regresyon 
 
 
 Seçimlerdeki katılımı inceleyen daha önceki çalışmalar çoğunlukla genel 
seçimlerdeki katılıma odaklanmış ve katılımı etkilediği düşünülen faktörleri birey, 
ülkeler-arası ve ülke genelini temelinde irdelemişlerdir. Bu çalışmalarda yerel, bölgesel, 
uluslararası ve başkanlık seçimleri sadece genel seçimlerle olan ilişkileri ve genel 
seçimlerdeki katılım üzerindeki etkileri doğrultusunda incelenmişlerdir.  
 
 Bu tez çalışması yerel seçimlerdeki katılım oranını bağımlı değişken olarak ele 
almış ve hem genel seçimleri hem de yerel seçimleri birleştiren bir veri dosyası 
oluşturmuştur. Yerel seçimlerden belediye başkanlığı ve il meclis üyeleri seçimleri 
katılım oranları kullanılmıştır. İlk regresyon modelinde sosyoekonomik ve kurumsal 
değişkenlerin 1977 ve 1999 genel ve yerel seçimlerdeki katılım üzerindeki etkileri il 
bazında test edilmiştir.  İkinci ve temel regresyon denkleminde ise sosyoekonomik ve 
kurumsal değişkenlere ek olarak parti sistemi değişkenlerinin 1950’den bu yana yapılan 
genel ve yerel seçimlerdeki katılımın üzerindeki etkisi ülke geneli temelinde test 
edilmiştir.  
 
            İstatistiksel testlerin sunduğu sonuçlar büyük oranda sosyoekonomik ve 
kurumsal faktörlerin genel seçimlerde olduğu kadar yerel seçimler üzerindeki beklenen 
etkisini de desteklemektedir.  
 
Uygulanan iki regresyon modelinin sonucu da Oy Kullanma Zorunluluğu’nun 
seçimlerde katılımı artıran en etkili değişken olduğunu gösterdi. Genel olarak sonuçlar 
Rasyonel Seçim Teorisi’nin tahminlerini onaylasa da bu çalışmada görüldü ki ekonomik 
durum iyileştikçe katılımın arttığını ön gören beklentiler Türkiye’deki genel ve yerel 
seçimler için doğrulanmadı.  
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  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In comparative work on voter turnout, the two most important questions address 
why voter turnout is higher in some countries and what factors explain why people vote 
in elections. Thus far, research done at individual, cross-national and nation-wide levels 
have come to different conclusions to explain the relationship between electoral 
participation ratio (in national elections) and individual, socioeconomic, institutional, 
and party system motivations. Although other types of elections such as local, regional 
and supra-national are examined in terms of their relationship and influence on national 
elections, these elections are not operationalized as dependent variables, and the same 
determinants are not tested for these elections.  
 
This thesis aims to investigate similar questions by concentrating on both 
national and local (municipal) electoral results in Turkey, and examine the main 
socioeconomic, institutional and party system determinants that affect electoral 
participation, and test whether these results comply-with the motivations in other 
Western countries and cost-benefit analysis framework of rational choice theory.   
 
Merging national electoral data (from 1950 to 2002, 14 elections)1 with local 
electoral results (from 1963 to 2004, 9 elections), this study will test whether 
socioeconomic environment variables (size of population, GNP per capita, and growth 
in GNP per capita), institutional setting variables (type of election, electoral system, 
compulsory voting), and party system variables (number of parties in the election, and 
competitiveness in the election) are statistically significant to determine the electoral 
                                                 
1 In May 2007, early elections are decided to be done in July 2007 (instead of its normal 
date November 2007). However at the time of writing this thesis, 2007 electoral 
participation results were not known, and they are not included to the study.  
 2
participation rate in Turkey by utilizing a multiple regression model for each dependent 
variable. To measure the increase in GNP per capita, size of population, and party 
numbers, logarithms of these variables are used in the dataset.  
 
In order to test these socioeconomic, institutional, and party system variables, in 
addition to the national electoral results, results of 2 forms of local elections namely 
mayor of municipality and members of provincial council elections will be used. This 
will mainly increase the number of cases (observations) from 23 to 32 and provides 
more relevant statistics for the research. Moreover, due to the fact that the mayor of 
municipality elections use Plurality (First Past The Post) with narrow or small electoral 
constituencies, the members of provincial council elections use Proportional 
Representative (PR), and the national elections between 1950-1957 use Plurality with 
large electoral constituencies, (where as after 1961 PR electoral system is adopted for 
national elections); Turkey makes an interesting case to test the effect of election type 
(national or local), and electoral system (plurality or PR) on voter turnout.  
 
 Considering the high level of increase in the size of population, fluctuations in 
economic conditions and the application of compulsory voting after 1980, these 
socioeconomic, institutional, and party system variables also become significant to 
understand voter behavior of Turkey. It also allows one to test the significance of these 
variables within a country. With regard to the influence of the “number of parties” and 
“competitiveness” in the elections, this study will examine the volatility and 
fragmentation in Turkish national and local elections, and will try to construct a pattern 
for Turkish politics.  
 
 As the methodology, multiple regression models will be applied to test the 
significance of aggregate-level time series data. Most of the data of the variables are 
taken from SIS (State Statistic Institute)2. The SIS (2003) provides the national election 
results from 1954 to 2002, but participation result of 1950 election are taken from  
www.secimsonucu.com, after it is verified that its national electoral results for the other 
national elections corresponds with the data of SIS. Participation results of two local 
elections handled before 1963 (1950, and 1955 elections) will not be used in the 
                                                 
2 “State Statistic Institute” is now changed to “Turkey Statistic Institution”.  
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regression because of inaccurate data. SIS data is used for the participation results in the 
local elections except the result of 2004 local administration elections. 2004 electoral 
result is taken from www.yerelnet.org.tr. The same sources are also used to obtain 
socioeconomic and party system variables as well. The institutional setting variables 
“election type”, “electoral system” and “compulsory voting” are coded by myself.   
 
The analysis shall begin with the brief introduction to history of establishment of 
political participation and democracy, and discussion of the importance of political 
participation for democratic theory. Rational choice theory will be mentioned as another 
perspective of this discussion and its approach to voter turnout will be utilized by 
mainly considering its merits and limits3. Keeping the “voting paradox” explain what 
this is at this stage in mind, the three analyses within the literature namely individual-
level, cross-national and nation-wide that try to search for the determinants for political 
participation will be issued. In chapter II, Turkish political history, party system and 
relationship between national and local elections will be examined in detail. In order to 
display this relationship, the electoral participation rates of the provinces in Turkey will 
be analyzed for the election years 1977 and 1999 in which national and local elections 
have been made in the same year. Here, a multiple regression model will be used to 
examine cross-sectional data and the significance of the variables. This chapter will also 
illustrate an electoral participation pattern for Turkey by constructing volatility, and 
fragmentation index for Turkish elections. To combine these chapters, rational choice 
theory will help to explain why these socioeconomic, institutional and party system 
variables are selected for this thesis, and what their expected effects on electoral 
participation rate are. Chapter III will display the variables in detail, and their expected 
effects with regard to rational choice theory. Chapter IV will analyze the findings of the 
multiple regression model and discuss Turkey’s common and different features from the 
general literature. Chapter V, will be based on conclusions of the analysis.  
 
Besides merging participation rates of national and local elections within the 
same dataset, and using local electoral results as a dependent variable, by displaying 
volatility and fragmentation index for Turkish elections, this thesis will also question 
                                                 
3 Andre Blais, To Vote or Not to Vote, The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice 
Theory, (University of Pittsburg Press, 2000). 
 
 4
whether it will make any difference to vote in elections or not. In other words, it will 
both contribute to the literature on rational choice theory, and help to position Turkey’s 
location in world politics. As to policy relevance of these analyses, the thesis aims at 
clarifying how alterations of election systems could affect turnout and thus an important 
indicator for the healthiness of a given electoral democracy.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
I) Political Participation and Democracy 
 
 
Free and fair elections are the fundamental principle for democracy, and voting in 
these (national, local or supra-national) elections is the basic form of political 
participation4. Electoral systems define how votes are cast and seats are allocated, 
therefore it directly influences electoral participation and voting behavior of the 
electorates as well. There are three main electoral systems: Plurality; Proportional 
Representation (PR); and Mixed (Hybrid)5.  
 
In Plurality electoral system – also known as First Past the Post (FPTP)-to be 
elected, a candidate needs simply to have more votes than any other challenger. This 
makes the plurality voting system among the simplest of all voting systems. Under the 
plurality rule, even when voters cast as many individual votes as there are members to 
be elected, party cohesion usually allows the majority party to sweep all (or almost all) 
seats. For an example, the United Kingdom uses the plurality electoral system, in which 
                                                 
4 With in the framework of the democratic theory, the role of the electoral participation 
for the functioning and legitimacy of democracy encompasses a wide place. The 
literature on the relationship between political participation and democracy is highly 
enriched. For a brief history of political participation and a significant evaluation of the 
evolution of democracy from Ancient Greece to modern times look at Anthony Birch, 
Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy [e-source], (Newyork: Routledge; 1993).  
 
5 Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris, “Introduction: Comparing 
Democratic Elections”, Comparing Democracies 2: new challenges in the study of 
elections and voting , edited by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, Pippa Norris., 
(London: Thousand Oaks, 2004).  
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659 different districts select one candidate and these candidates composes 659 seats in 
the parliament. Canada, India and the United States can be given as an example for the 
other countries use the plurality electoral system6.  
 
The Majority-plurality electoral system is a complex form of plurality, in which 
the winner is declared only if he or she can muster up more than half of the votes. If no 
candidate obtains a majority, a second and final ballot is held between two candidates 
who received the highest number of votes in the first round. Similar to FPTP, in this 
electoral system, the proportionality of the votes is not considered. Each district has one 
seat in the parliament. Within Western democracies, France has been categorized as a 
country that uses this system7.  
 
Proportional representative (PR) electoral systems aim to allocate a close match 
between the percentage of votes which the candidates obtain in elections and the 
percentage of seats in the parliament. There are two main forms of PR system: party-
lists and single transferable vote (STV). In the list-system PR, the list of the candidates 
are given by political parties (party presidents) and in STV, preferences do not depend 
on the existence of parties but are entirely left up to the voters. Between the years 1950-
1961, Turkey used plurality, but it changed to a PR list-system after 1961, which has yet 
to be altered. Today in Turkish elections by using PR electoral system 81 districts 
chooses 550 deputies in the parliament, and the allocation of the seats has been 
managed by using D’Hont electoral formula8.  
 
A mixed (hybrid) electoral system combines PR with either plurality or majority 
systems. For instance, in Germany, a mixed electoral system is used which combines 
                                                 
6 For detail information on the electoral systems of the democracies look at Ibid. p.10-
12. This study shows that in many democratic countries PR and mixed electoral system 
has been used in large numbers, whereas the number of countries which prefers to use 
the plurality electoral system is very limited.  
 
7 It should be noted that in 1986 French electoral system was changed from majority to 
PR, and in 1988 it changed back to majority.  
 
8 Andre Blais and Louis Massicotte, “Electoral Systems”, Comparing Democracies 2: 
new challenges in the study of elections and voting , edited by Lawrence LeDuc, 
Richard G. Niemi, Pippa Norris., (London: Thousand Oaks, 2004), p. 44-49.  
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PR with plurality. In Germany PR seats are distributed in a corrective way, and each 
party gets its fair share of seats. Each voter has two votes. 328 votes coming from each 
district go to candidates by plurality in single member districts, and the 328 districts 
also vote for a party by PR in a single national constituency9.  In other words, voting for 
the candidates is in plurality system, whereas party votes are determined by PR electoral 
system.  
 
Each country has its own electoral system structure, which has been shaped by 
their historical, social and political culture. According to Philippe C. Schmitter and 
Terry Lynn Karl’s article “What Democracy Is and Is Not”10 all democratic countries 
have “unique” conditions in themselves; because “democracy does not consist of a 
single unique set of institutions”, “the specific form of democracy takes is contingent 
upon a country’s socioeconomic conditions as well as its entrenched state structures and 
policy practices”11. Therefore electoral systems are important not only to practice 
democracy but to maintain democracy as well.  
 
Furthermore, it is expected that different types of electoral systems would bring 
different levels of voter turnout and would affect different types of voting behavior. In 
this thesis, the electoral system structure and stability in democracy will be discussed 
within a theoretical basis and the relationship between electoral systems and electoral 
participation rates will be analyzed drawing from the assumptions of rational choice 
theory. This theory enables one to understand why participation rates are expected to be 
higher in PR systems compared to other electoral systems.  
 
In addition to the discussion on the different types of electoral systems, it should 
be noted that, today the meaning of democracy has also changed. Liberal democracy is 
                                                 
9 LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, “Introduction: Comparing Democratic Elections”, 
Comparing Democracies 2, p.11.  
 
10 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is and Is Not”, in 
Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
 
11 Ibid. p.50 
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defined as “a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the 
rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, 
assembly, religion, and property”12. In other words, besides its dimension of 
“government by people” the importance of political participation of people, 
“government for people” began to be more salient for the citizens. Moreover, in 
addition to voting in national and local elections, or in referendums, other forms of 
political participation became more commonplace and accepted as a determinant of a 
consolidated democratic regime.  
 
These forms of political participation can be categorized as “canvassing or 
campaigning in elections; active membership of a political party or a pressure group; 
political demonstrations; various forms of civil disobedience; membership of 
government advisory committees or consumer’s councils for publicly owned industries; 
client involvement in the implementation of social policies; and various forms of 
community actions”13. These forms of political participation are seen as “direct forms of 
participation” rather than “representative participation,” which is characteristic of just 
casting a ballet in elections for parliamentary democracy.  Similar to Athenian 
democracy, there are fewer citizens who engage in direct forms of participation, due to 
the fact that it requires more spare time, money, energy, common interest and 
commitment (more cost in general) than just casting a vote.   
 
Thus, compared to the other forms of political participation, voting in local and 
national elections is the fundamental, simplest and most widespread political 
participation act in democracies14. Without “government by people”, “government for 
people” cannot be legitimized and cannot function democratically, therefore 
representative participation is a core determinant for parliamentary democracy.   
 
                                                 
12 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No.6 
(1997). 
 
13 Birch, Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy,  p. 105. 
 
14 Morris P. Fiorina, “The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects”, The 
Journal of Politics, Vol.38, (1976), pp.390-413. 
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On the other hand, it should be mentioned that even though participation in 
elections is the most fundamental aspect of democracy, the level of participation does 
not necessary indicate the level of democracy within a country. For instance, in USA 
voter turnout is very low compared to the other Western democracies, even though the 
US’s is identity is highly tied to its democratic government.  This is due in part because 
citizens engage in other forms of political participation. In addition, the high number of 
elections within a year, and institutional setting can be given as other the explanations 
for this low level of voter turnout.  Thus determining the variables that influence voting 
in a country is crucial in order to analyze its commitment to democracy. In his study, , 
also mentions that the level of political participation does not necessary provide strong 
democracy. Instead he presents strong party systems15 (institutionalized party systems)16 
as the key feature for consolidated democracy.  
 
Some comparativists argue that the quality of participation is more salient than 
quantity of voter turnout. However, low levels of participation can cause legitimacy 
problems for the government, and may enable some extremist parties to be successful in 
elections. Therefore, high levels of turnout should be taken as a crucial element for 
maintaining democracy (though not necessarily for indicating it).  Though voter turnout 
does not correlate with the level of democracy, many political scientists are concerned 
about the recent decline of voter turnout in some Western democracies due to the fact 
that health of a democracy is seen in terms of its level of turnout17. Because there is an 
                                                 
15 Bingham G. Powell, Contemporary Democracies: participation, stability and 
violence, (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1982). 
 
16 Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, Building Democratic Institutions: Party 
Systems in Latin America, (Stanford University Pres: Stanford), p.459 
According to the article, institutionalized party systems are important to process 
democratic consolidation and it implies 4 conditions: stability in inter-party 
competition, the existence of parties that have somewhat stable roots in society, 
acceptance of parties and elections as the legitimate institutions that determine who 
governs, and party organizations with reasonably stable rules and structures.  
 
17 Mark Franklin, “The Dynamics of Electoral Participation”, Comparing Democracies 
2: new challenges in the study of elections and voting , edited by Lawrence LeDuc, 
Richard G. Niemi, Pippa Norris., (London: Thousand Oaks, 2004). 
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overall decline in turnout all over the continent18, it begs the question of whether or not 
these changes have been caused by changes in European social and political systems 
and ideas. These changes can be categorized as European integration, denationalization, 
depolarization, and alternations in cleavages19. However, it is interesting that the level 
of decline in turnout differs among European countries, and the decline is seen 
especially in countries with high levels of democratic stability and consolidation. 
Detailed explanations of social and political changes in Western countries and its 
connection to electoral participation will be discussed later in this thesis in order to 
illustrate voter turnout as a tradeoff between democratic stability and representative 
fairness.   
 
Within the debate on political participation and democracy, this thesis will only 
focus on the electoral voting act in Turkey as the form of political participation, and 
take the electoral participation rates as the dependent variable for the research. In this 
analysis any direct connection between the level of turnout and level of democracy will 
be avoided, however voter turnout ratios will be examined within the historical, 
socioeconomic, political conditions of the electoral year in order to explain it in terms of 
the democratic situation. Only the data of national and local elections which were 
considered to be free and fair elections will be the concern of this study. The national 
elections examined will be from 1950 to 2002; and from 1963 to 2004 for local 
elections20.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 There is a dispute about recent European turnout decline regarding the number of 
years considered ‘recent’. Since 1945 there was first a rise and then a fall in turnout, so 
turnout has declined from a high point in 1960s, but not over a longer period.  
 
19 Paul Webb, Developments in West European Politics 2, (eds.) by Paul Heywood, Erik 
Jones, and Martin Rhodes, (New York : Palgrave, 2002).  
 
20 In Turkey, women were given the right to vote in municipality and national elections 
in 1930 and 1934 respectively. Therefore in all of the aforementioned elections in this 
study, both men and women participated. 
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II) Approach of Rational Choice Theory and Voting Paradox 
 
 
The Enlightenment intellectuals supported limited and direct participation of 
citizens to decision-making processes; they perceived participation in politics as a civic 
virtue, combining different views into a consensus which requires sacrifice of individual 
interests as for serving to “general will”21 or “greatest happiness”22. In other words, 
whether it was limited or directly made, political participation was a collective action 
done for the good of the people and nation. Although voting in elections is the simplest, 
most fundamental and the most wide-spread form of political participation, and political 
act in democracy, according to the rational choice theory, this collective action is 
irrational23.  
 
In general, rational choice theory assumes that all individual’s preferences are 
economically rational in that they behave consistently24. With regard to its theorem on 
consistency, rational choice theory has four fundamental assumptions25: utility 
maximization, the structure of preferences, decision making under conditions of 
uncertainty, and the centrality of individuals in the explanation of collective outcomes. 
                                                 
21 David Bucher, and Paul Kelly, The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls, (London: 
Routledge, 1994), p.116. 
 
22 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (London: Electric 
Book, 2001), p.14.  
 
23 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, (Newyork: John Wiley, 
1951). 
 
24 Mark Skousen and Kenna C. Taylor, Puzzles and Paradoxes in Economics, 
(Cheltenham UK: E.Elgar Pun, 1997), p.175. 
According to this study, the ideal voting mechanism should satisfy five conditions: 
group rationality; unrestricted domain; Pareto optimality; independence from non-
agenda alternatives; and non-dictatorship. With regard to these assumptions, Arrow’s 
theorem displayed that there is no voting mechanism that can satisfy all the ideal 
conditions.  
On the other hand, in this thesis study, the assumptions given by Downs’ study will be 
used because they are explanations are simpler.  
 
25 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper, 1957), 
p.13.  
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According to these assumptions, each individual (rational) tries to maximize the 
expected value of his own payoff (utility) with regard to their preferences and given 
(available) information. Thus, when rational choice theory is applied to voting, people 
vote in order to determine the outcome of the political process, and hope to benefit from 
it.  
 
• Model of Voting 
The Model of voting has four quantities26.  
B: The benefits a voter derive from seeing his or her preferred candidate win. 
P: The opportunity to cast the decision ballot is at best an uncertain prospect and 
assigns to it the probability weight.  
D: Selective incentives of voting represent the utility received as a direct 
consequence of casting a ballot.  
C: The costs of voting range from transportation expenses to foregone 
opportunities to earn wages.  
 
 The model requires that an individual will cast a vote if the sum of expected (not 
actual because there is uncertainty) benefits and selective incentives exceeds the cost of 
voting, in other words if: 
            PxB + D > C.  
 
 Because it is a subjective quantity, and is unsupported by evidence, most of the 
political scientists exclude D -selective incentives- from their model. This study will 
also use a model that excludes the D quantity, because there is no available survey data 
for Turkey to test the influence of D on electoral participation in individual-level, and 
socioeconomic, institutional, and party system variables can be explained better by 
aggregate data referring to the relationship between P, B, and C. Therefore, the final 
model for voting suggests that an electorate vote if; PxB>C.  
 
In this rational choice model, the expected benefit of voting is equal the 
probability of her casting the decisive vote (P), multiplied by the benefit (B) she would 
gain from having her preferred candidate win rather than lose. Therefore, the rational 
                                                 
26 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p.48.  
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individual must determine the probability that her vote will be decisive, and what the 
chances that her vote decides her preferred candidate to win or lose. Here, Blais points 
out a basic logic exercise that if “her preferred candidate is sure to win, the expected 
benefit of voting is nil, since her candidate will win whether she votes or not; and if her 
preferred candidate is sure to lose, the outcome of the election is the same whatever she 
does and the expected benefit of voting in nil”27. This logic suggest that only if two 
candidates receive equal votes in the election, then a vote of a single individual would 
be decisive (effective) to influence the outcome. With this regard, there are only two 
factors which can determine the expected benefits of voting: size of population and 
competitiveness of election (closer race between the two candidates).  
 
However, since P is bound to be extremely small (considering the millions of 
voters in every election), the expected benefit is extremely low. When the model for 
voting is considered (above), it occurred that the influence of one individual vote in 
elections is nearly nil. Based on the application of the rational choice model, in an 
election with a large number of voters the rational citizen will decide not to vote. Hence 
as Aldrich claims “although all may benefit from voting, it is rarely in the individual’s 
self-interest to vote”28. Downs also demonstrate that it is not rational to vote, or to 
contribute time, money or effort to maintaining it29. In other words, the cost of voting 
exceeds the expected benefit from voting even the cost of voting is very small as well. 
Moreover, after every election the government that wins the election has a responsibility 
to protect and advance the interests of the whole nation, not just to look after its own 
political supporters, or the electorates that cast a vote for it. Hence, instead of voting, it 
is expected that people will behave as a free-rider30. They will choose not to vote, but 
can still benefit from the outcome of elections, and receive the same services from the 
state and reforms of the government.  
                                                 
27 Blais, To Vote or Not to Vote, p. 1. 
 
28 John Aldrich, “Rational Choice and Turnout”, American Journal of Political Science, 
Vol.37, (1993), pp. 246-278. 
 
29 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 112.  
 
30 Free riders are actors who consume more than their fair share of a resource, or 
shoulder less than a fair share of the costs of its production. 
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From the approach of rational choice theory, it can be said that an increase in the 
number of people who are eligible to participate in the elections is expected to create a 
reduction in the voter turnout. This assumption suggests that Rousseau’s “general will” 
argument and Mill’s “greatest happiness” principle correspond with the application of 
rational choice theory because they were argued in favor of limited and direct 
participation. Moreover, framing political participation as a civic duty and as a sacrifice 
for the nation, increases the value of quantity D, and motivates people to participate. 
The same logic can be applied for the other forms of political participation. Even though 
it is more costly in terms of time, money and commitment for the participants to be 
involved in these actions compared to just casting a vote in an election, they demand a 
few number of participants who have common interests and directly participate in the 
community. This means, as a member of a small community, they cannot behave as a 
free-rider, full commitment is required. On the other hand direct participation also 
brings direct benefit from the outcome of the action.  
 
 Kenneth Arrow showed that there is no institution, including majority voting, 
that could guarantee a consistent set of outcomes, and in other words voting in elections 
(the basis of democracy) is irrational, it cannot explain why in every election (national, 
local, and supra-national) millions of people voluntarily act and go to cast a vote. This 
“paradox of voting” brings the question of whether rational choice theory can be applied 
to political science. One criticism of Arrow’s model is about the rationality of 
individuals. In Arrow’s model, individuals are assumed to be economically rational 
(fully informed), however it overlooks the fact that voters often face issues whose costs 
and benefits are difficult to discern and for which their preferences may not be well 
developed31. It is hard to calculate total benefits and costs of an action, which is also 
correct for voting.  
 
On the other hand, even rational choice theory cannot explain the “voting 
paradox”, which as Knight asserts, has significantly advanced our understanding of the 
                                                 
31 Skousen and Taylor, Puzzles and Paradoxes in Economics, p.180. 
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role of institutions in social life32. It is consistent and efficient in explaining human 
behaviors, such as why and how they act with regard to cost and benefit analysis. 
Although rational choice theory does not explain why so many people are inclined to 
vote in every election, it helps to rationalize the effects of determinants in both macro 
and micro-level studies. In other words, rational choice theory can explain why in PR 
electoral systems, people vote more than in plurality system; but it fails to explain why 
a significant number of people in plurality systems also vote, not why some people in 
PR system do not cast a vote. For instance, it helps us to assume that participation is 
expected to decrease as the size of the population decreases or the participation is 
expected to increase as competitiveness between parties increase. Or in countries that 
apply compulsory voting33, voter turnout is expected to increase because it increases the 
cost for the electorates.  
 
Studies on voter turnout are trying to understand why participation is higher in 
some countries, whether differences in participation depend on individual-level, 
motivational or institutional-level differences. While analyzing which determinant is 
more effective and applicable, or even choosing the variables to be tested they use the 
merits and logic of rational choice theory mentioned above. Therefore, analyses of 
cross-national, individual-level and nation-wide studies are important to understand the 
influence of individual, socioeconomic,  institutional, and party system variables on 
electoral participation; and this thesis will test the significance of these variables for 
Turkish national and local elections. Before applying the statistical tests to our 
hypotheses, it is beneficial to touch on the studies of voter turnout and general 
determinants for political participation in three levels by referring to rational choice 
theory logic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p.181.  
 
33 A sanction is applied for failure to vote. 
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III) The Determinants for Political Participation: Social and Political Changes, and 
Individual, Cross-national and Nation-wide Level Analysis 
 
 
a) Social and Political Changes in Europe 
 
In general the turnout ratio is decreasing (continuously) within EU member 
countries from 1950s to 2000s. For this overall decline, social and political changes in 
Europe such as EU-integration, denationalization, globalization, depolarization and 
alternations in cleavages are considered to be the main reasons. These social and 
political changes in Europe are highly related with cross-national and nation-wide 
analyses and salient part of literature on political participation, therefore it is necessary 
to mention them before explaining the socioeconomic, institutional, and party system 
determinants of electoral participation. Table 1.1 indicates the average voter turnout 
ratios of some of Western democracies (national elections) since 1945, and Table 1.2 
shows the average voter turnout for Turkey since 1950. 
 
Table 1.1 Average Turnouts since 1945 in Western Democracies  
Country/percent 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s* 
Austria 95.3 93.8 92.3 91.6 83.8 
Belgium 93.1 91.3 93.0 93.9 91.5 
Denmark 81.8 87.3 88.4 86.7 85.0 
Finland 76.5 85.1 78.2 73.9 67.4 
France 80.0 76.6 76.5 71.9 68.5 
Germany 86.9 87.1 90.9 87.3 79.9 
Greece n/a n/a 80.4 83.5 78.1 
Ireland 74.3 74.2 76.5 72.9 67.3 
Italy 93.8 92.9 92.3 89.0 84.5 
Luxembourg 91.9 89.6 89.5 88.1 87.4 
Netherlands 95.4 95.0 83.5 83.5 76.0 
Portugal n/a n/a 87.5 78.0 65.2 
Spain n/a n/a 72.6 73.4 74.6 
Sweden 78.7 86.4 90.4 89.1 85.4 
United Kingdom 80.3 76.6 75.0 74.1 69.6 
Norway 78.8 82.8 81.6 83.1 76.3 
Switzerland 69.0 64.2 52.3 48.2 43.8 
Malta 78.1 90.3 94.0 95.4 96.2 
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Iceland 90.8 91.3 90.4 89.4 86.4 
Average ** 85.0 86.7 85.2 83.6 79.1 
Notes: * includes 2000-1; ** excludes Switzerland 
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in Developments in West European 
Politics, edited by Paul Heywood, Erik Jones, and Martin Rhodes, (New York : Palgrave, 2002) 
 
Table 1.2 Average Turnout since 1950 in Turkey 
Turkey/percent 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s* 
Average 84.8 72.3 69.6 92.8 83.8 
Notes: * includes 2002 national election as well.  
Source: State Statistic Institute 
 
Today, a European Union citizen needs to participate in four types of elections: 
local, regional, national and supranational. It is expected that the voter turnout level in 
national elections would be higher than the supranational level. On the other hand, both 
Franklin34 and Lijphart35 point out that the frequency of elections has a negative effect 
on the voting ratios. Hence, as an additional type of election, supranational level 
elections can affect indirectly the voter turnout levels in the national elections. This is 
also true for local elections. Generally, the literature on the voter turnout suggests that 
the voter turnout in the national elections is expected to be higher than the electoral 
participation in the local elections. On the other hand, these two elections can also 
influence each other in terms of voter turnout. If the local election is very close (after) to 
the national election, electoral participation in this local election is expected to be 
lower; but if the local election is made just before the national election, it is perceived to 
be a national election and the turnout ratio is expected to be high.  
 
                                                 
34 Mark Franklin, “Electoral Engineering and Cross- National Turnout Differences: 
What Role for Compulsory Voting?”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.29, 
(1999), pp.205-216.  
Franklin also indicates an interesting point that the importance of the European 
Parliament elections chances according to the time period between the two national 
elections, and the time of the previous national election. If the previous national election 
is made every two-three years, and there is time to the next national elections, then the 
voter turnout at the supranational level is expected to be high.  
 
35 Arend Lijphart, “Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma”, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol.91, No.1, (Mar, 1997), pp.1-14. 
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Moreover, if the voter turnout in recent elections36 is compared, the ratio is 67.9% 
for France, 82.2% for Germany, 59.4% for UK and 87.1% for Turkey. Table 1.1 and 
Table 1.2 suggest that in contrast to average voter turnout in Western European 
countries, after the 1980s the electoral participation rate in Turkey has been higher than 
the European average. This could be partly explained by the application of the 1982 
Constitutional Law, when Turkey adopted compulsory voting.  However, a decrease in 
voter turnout after 1980s has been also observed in countries practicing compulsory 
voting such as Belgium and Austria. In addition to its compulsory voting characteristic, 
the denationalization theory supporters can argue that Turkey has a high level of turnout 
because Turkish citizens only participate in local and national elections; and their 
national government does not have the denationalization and globalization problems 
that the Europeans face.  
 
Therefore, it can be claimed that compared to the denationalization and EU 
integration process assumptions, depolarization and change in cleavages after 1980 are 
better explanatory determinants of the decline. However, again these hypotheses are not 
sufficient to identify cross-national differences in voter turnout levels.  
 
The altering of values (voter’s position on a single left-right value-dimension) also 
has an impact on other predispositions37 such as identification and interest/cleavages. 
The decline in party identification, especially in the relationship between class and 
party, caused the decrease in voter turnout, because parties also became less polarized. 
People began to lose their trust in politicians and parties due to coalition governments 
composed of both leftist and rightist parties. Polarization in party system signifies 
ideological distances between the major protagonists in the system. As ideological 
polarization lost its dominance in societies, parties moved closer to center rather than 
                                                 
36 LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, “Introduction: Comparing Democratic Elections”, 
Comparing Democracies 2: new challenges in the study of elections and voting , edited 
by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, Pippa Norris., (London: Thousand Oaks, 
2004), pp. 16-39.  
 
37 William L. Miller and Richard G. Niemi, “Voting: Choice, Conditioning and  
Constraint”, Comparing Democracies 2: new challenges in the study of elections and 
voting , edited by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, Pippa Norris., (London: 
Thousand Oaks, 2004), p.170.  
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the edges of left-right spectrum. Change in classical cleavages and decline in cleavage 
voting was also assumed to be the determinant of the decline in voter turnout in Europe. 
In general, a cleavage implies a socio-political fault line between social groups which is 
powerful enough to structure political and more specially party political conflict38.  
 
According to Lipset and Rokkan39, the bases of traditional cleavages were formed 
by two main revolutions: National and Industrial Revolutions. While National 
Revolution created the fault line between center-periphery (the nation-state defender, 
revolutionary center and resisting traditional periphery) and religious sects (Catholic vs. 
Protestant, and Catholic vs. Secular), the Industrial Revolution caused a struggle 
between urban-rural and owner-worker. It is believed that the center coincides with left 
ideology, and the periphery with right ideology, and the same relation is valid between 
center and urban, and periphery and rural. Moreover, as the defender of nation-state 
centralization and revolution, the center also supports secularism. Therefore, it can be 
claimed that there is a strong relationship between ideological polarization and 
traditional cleavages.  
 
Lipset and Rokkan claimed that these traditional cleavages continued from 1920s 
to 1960s due to the “freezing hypothesis”, however cleavages began to change 
afterwards. A number of significant cleavages have emerged since this hypothesis. The 
“realignment” is seen in the four main and new cleavages namely, ethnic cleavages 
(new form of center-periphery fault line); post-materialism; post-war immigration and 
multiculturalism; and EU Integration (con and pro of integration). The detailed 
explanations of these new cleavages will not be given in this study, however it can be 
claimed that they have had an impact on attitudes of people and politics of parties. This 
“realignment” caused a “de-alignment” with time. It is assumed that people are de-
aligned, or not attached to politics, due to higher levels of education, the mass media, 
less partisan identification, and the decreased importance of cleavages, which makes 
                                                 
38 Paul Webb, “Party Systems, Electoral Cleavages and Government”, in Developments 
in West European Politics 2, (eds.) by Paul Heywood, Erik Jones and Martin Rhodes, 
(New York : Palgrave, 2002), p. 116.  
 
39S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: An Introduction', in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967).  
 
 20
people believe that they can decide on their own and do not need the classical channels, 
such as voting in order to influence political outcomes.  
 
Hence the common assumption on the influence of changes on ideological and 
classical cleavages can be accepted in some terms, because as both Franklin and 
Lijphart point out competitiveness in elections increases the salience of an election and 
this brings about higher levels of voter turnout. As the competitiveness in elections are 
highly correlated with ideological polarization within the competing parties and social 
cleavages form the polarization, depolarization and changes in cleavage structures seem 
to be the reason for the decline in voter turnout . This thesis does not ignore the 
influence of depolarization and change in cleavages on the decline of participation. 
Instead, as mentioned above it argues that these variables can better explain the decline 
compared to denationalization and the EU Integration process, and is highly related with 
institutional determinants. However, it is significant to issue that these variables are not 
sufficient to explain the voter turnout differences within the European countries which 
face the same processes. In addition to, the common views on the reasons for the 
decline in voter turnout, electoral systems and institutional settings play the most 
important role in determining the turnout level, even if it cannot explain the overall 
decline- as they are not changed over time.  
 
Paradoxically it turns out that while significant ideological polarization among 
parties makes democratic government more problematic40, and “in countries with 
inchoate party systems and multi-partyism it is easy to imagine scenarios of increasing 
polarization”41, polarization also increases the salience of elections and thus the voter 
turnout. In other words, voter turnout becomes an indicator of the trade-off between 
fairness and stability. According to Duverger42 there is a consistent relationship between 
elections and party systems: plurality leads to two-party system and proportional 
                                                 
40 Peter Mair, “Comparing Party Systems”, in LeDuc, Lawrance et. al (eds), Comparing 
Democracies 2, (Sage Publications: London, 2002), p.28. 
 
41 Ibid. p.29.  
 
42 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, (New York: Valley, 1954).  
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representation (PR) leads to multiparty system. Which means, in PR election systems, 
fragmentation is expected to be higher. However, the degree of fragmentation may not 
have an effect on the expectation of success in democracies. Powell43 says multiparty 
system also brings high political participation and there is not any certain theory about 
its influence on the government stability and protection of the political order. Moreover, 
it is known that in some countries where the political system is pluralistic political 
participation is less compared to PR systems.  
 
Hence, we can assume a triangle relation between the electoral system, the party 
system, and the level of political participation.  The electoral system defines how votes 
are cast and seats are allocated. Hence it determines the allocation of parties in the 
parliament; it affects polarization, fragmentation and voter turnout difference. Moreover 
it constructs the tradeoff between fairness and stability. However, this statement does 
not mean that low turnout leads to higher levels of stability everywhere, or if electorates 
decide not to vote this does not make democracy more stable. The conditioning is 
sensible when the effect of the electoral system on voter turnout is questioned, not the 
reverse. With regard to this discussion, this thesis will examine also Turkish politics on 
the basis of the relationship between the electoral system, the party system (volatility 
and fragmentation in parliament) and voter turnout.   
 
 
b) Individual-level, Cross-National, and Nation-wide Analysis 
 
In his article, Mark Franklin mentions three theories that motivate people to vote: 
individual resources, political mobilization and instrumental motivations44. The first two 
are individual-level variables that explain electoral participation. Resource variables 
include age, gender, education, marital status, and occupation. Mobilization variables 
explain the impact of being a union member, being religious, and urban on voter 
turnout. Campaign variables such as political interest, party identification and party 
sympathy are also part of individual-level analysis.  
                                                 
43 Bingham G. Powell, Contemporary Democracies: participation, stability and 
violence, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982).  
 
44 Franklin, “What Role for Compulsory Voting?”, p.210.  
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In the individual resource, Franklin claims people who have knowledge, time and 
wealth participate more than those who don’t.  In their work Participation in America, 
Verba and Nie suggest that income, occupation and education level of individuals affect 
voting behavior45. Stephen D. Fisher46, proves that in Britain the level of political 
interest, age and gender (to be male) also have a positive effect on voting decisions. 
Regarding the relationship between age and voter turnout, Mark Franklin asserts that 
voting is a habit which is learned in their first few elections.  He adds that while 
decreasing voting age from 22 to 18 decreases electoral participation, practicing voting 
age at 16 is expected to increase electoral participation47. It is also mentioned that 
turnout is higher among those living with a spouse than among other members of the 
electorate48. The effect of religiosity, social and geographic context on voter turnout and 
voting behavior is also issued by many political scientists49. In addition, urban-rural 
analysis displays that the turnout is higher in urban areas compared to rural areas50.  
                                                 
45 Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and 
Social Equality, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).  
 
46 Stephen D. Fisher, “Tactical Voting and Tactical Non-Voting,” Presentation at the 
Annual Meeting of American Political Science Meeting, August-September 2001. In 
addition to this article Richard A. Seitzer, Jody Newman, and Melissa Leighton, Sex as 
a political variable: women as candidates and voters in U.S elections, (Boulder: 
Rienner, 1997). 
 
47 Mark N. Franklin, Voter Turnout and The Dynamics of Electoral Competition in 
Established Democracies Since 1945, (Cambridge University Press; 2004).  
 
48 Bruce C. Straits, “The Social Context of Voter Turnout”, The Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol.54, (1990), p.64-73.  
 
49 David Broughton, Religion and mass electoral behavior in Europe (electronic 
resource), (London: Rotledge Press, 2000). 
 
50 On the other hand, study of Ozbudun and Tachau showed that the opposite 
relationship is being observed in Turkey where voter turnout is lower in more 
industrialized, urbanized and modern cities of Turkey. They assert that Turkey is one of 
the countries where the rate of voting participation is higher in rural areas than in the 
cities. Whereas, in these cities electorates tend to vote for more stable parties compared 
to rural areas where patron-client relationship is more established.  
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Based on the assumptions set forth by rational choice theory, it is logical to expect 
as the individual resources of people increase the probability of participating in 
elections also increases, because they are expected to be more interested in politics 
(have resource to spend time, money etc. on learning about candidates), and benefit 
more from the election results. Males are known to be more interested in politics 
because they have higher individual resources than women51. As voting age decreases, 
interest in voting and level of individual resources will also reduce as do incentives to 
vote. Franklin argues that the costs of voting (such as to figure out how to register, 
where to find the polling place and how to vote) is higher for the first-time voters, and 
claims “the cost of learning to vote are raised considerably if a person’s first election 
falls during the period immediately after leaving high school”52. However if the voting 
age is reduced to 16, as Franklin asserts due to political socialization in school, this 
would create a social incentive to vote for the students, and because voting is a habit, 
these students are expected to vote in future elections as well. If it is perceived as a 
habit and part of social capital, again the incentive to vote is expected to be higher 
within married couples. If it is considered that political socialization is also shaped by 
attendance to religious places, similar logic can be applied for religious people who are 
expected to have a higher social network.  
 
In urban cities where individual resources such as literacy level, well-skilled 
occupation and income are high compared to rural areas, voter turnout is also expected 
to be high. Franklin’s study proves that there is a positive relationship between being 
urban and one’s intention to vote.  However, as note 59 indicates, the other studies 
                                                                                                                                               
Ergun Ozbudun and Frank Tachau, “Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: 
Toward a Critical Realignment?”, International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 6 
No.4,  (1975).  
Moreover, Blais’ study to Vote or Not to Vote: Merits and Limits of Rational Choice 
Theory, suggests that turnout in municipal elections decreases as the size of the city 
increases. In urban settings turnout is substantially lower for national elections.  
 
51 World Values Survey in Human Beliefs and Values, a cross cultural sourcebook 
based on the 199-2002 values surveys, (eds.) by Ronald Inglehart, Miguel Bosanez, 
Jaime Diez-Medrana, Lock Helman, and Ruud Luijkv. 
 
52 Ibid. p. 63. 
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argue the opposite. If it is considered that the social networks in cities are less than rural 
areas, and the size of the population is higher (which means probability to effect to 
electoral outcome decreases), it may be expected to observe a negative effect on voter 
turnout. Besides the influence of urbanization, geographical structure of the countries 
may also play determining role in voter turnout, voter behavior and party preferences of 
the electorates.  
 
At that point, it should be noted that because different set of data would produce a 
different numerical answer for the quantitative questions, contradicting results of the 
studies are not unusual in political science, and does not suggest an application problem, 
instead these results enrich the literature. Number of variables added in the regression 
model, or types of data set used such as cross-sectional, time series or panel 
(longitudinal) data may affect the correlation and sign or size of the coefficients of the 
model53.   
 
The campaign effect on voters through the activities of parties, candidates and 
interest groups constructs the second theory. Similar to individual resource and 
mobilization variables, campaign variables also create incentives to vote for the ones 
who are involved in politics and expect higher benefits from the electoral results. 
However Helena Catt54 suggests that due to the decline in party-identification within 
European society, campaigning and political activities do not have a high impact on 
electorates. Franklin agrees with this view and says “ leaving compulsory voting aside, 
studies of the effects of mobilization have found that real world differences in turnout 
obtained through differences in mobilizing efforts are small compared to the country-
level differences”55.  
                                                 
53 James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson, Introduction to Econometric, (Boston MA: 
Addison   Wesley, 2003). 
• Cross-sectional data consist of multiple entities observed at a single time period.  
• Time series data consist of a single entity observed at multiple time periods.  
• Panel data consist of multiple entities, where each entity is observed at two or 
more time periods.  
    
54 Helena Catt, Voting Behavior: a Radical Critique, (London: Leicester University 
Press, 1996). 
 
55 Franklin, “What Role for Compulsory Voting?”, p. 207.  
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On the other hand, it should be noted that if individual resources (or individual-
level variables) influence the incentive to vote in elections, this statement suggests that 
those who have less education, are not well-skilled, have a lesser income and live in 
rural areas are less likely to vote in elections and participate in politics. Therefore, even 
though votes of all citizens have equal value, and they have a right to participate in 
elections, in practice it is observed that inequality in society leads unequal participation 
of its citizens. In other words, this echoes the views of Rousseau and J.S Mill defend 
which suggest that not everyone should be allowed to participate equally, and only 
those who have higher levels of education and work in skilled occupations should have 
right to vote.  
 
Franklin points out that the individual-level approach fails to explain the reason of 
relatively high turnout in some Western countries since high turnout countries have just 
as much as variation in individual-level characteristics as do low-turnout countries. 
Franklin asserts that turnout varies much more from country to country than it does 
between different types of individuals. He argues that “it is a pity that so much effort 
was expended on studying individual-level determinants of turnout in a country where 
those determinants were doing little more than supporting a habit of voting in less 
competitive elections that had been acquired in earlier, more competitive, elections”. As 
an example for this failure (and as Table 1.1 also displays), he asks why turnout is the 
lowest in Switzerland which has the highest level of education, whereas in Malta where 
only a tiny proportion of the population is university educated, turnout is the highest. 
Hence, Franklin indicates instrumental motivations are superior to explain turnout 
differences from country to country and election to election, because it suggests the 
turnout varies with the importance of the election.  
 
Franklin sees the importance of cross-national variables (the instrumental 
motivations) for evaluating elections. The use of compulsory voting, postal voting, 
weekend voting, number of polling days and the presence of highly competitive party 
systems are all significant56. In other words, he points out the linkage between 
                                                                                                                                               
 
56 Franklin, “The Dynamics of Electoral Participation”, p.148.  
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institutions and instrumental motivations. For his analysis he utilizes panel data and 
measures these variables for many entities (23 democratic countries) which are 
observed since 1945.  
 
As indicated above under the discussion of denationalization and EU-integration, 
turnout is negatively affected by the frequency of elections. In addition to the local 
elections, supra-national elections held in Europe increases the frequency of election for 
the voters and create a reduction in voter turnout. Therefore, as expected the “number of 
polling days” variable in Franklin’s study is also accepted to decrease voter turnout. 
Franklin asserts that, weekend voting would increase the turnout compared to voting on 
working day, but not in high amounts. As postal voting is expected to reduce cost of 
voting for disabled or old people, it is expected to increase voter turnout.  
 
The salience of elections and competitive party systems are highly related with 
electoral systems of the countries. As mentioned above the electoral system defines how 
votes are cast and seats are allocated. Because the ‘’winner takes all’’ in plurality and 
majority electoral systems, this creates an incentive for the electorates not to vote 
because they know that the chances of influencing the electoral outcome is very low.  
They also realize their vote will be wasted if the preferred candidate has little chance to 
win. On the other hand, in proportional representative electoral systems political parties 
are represented in parliament in a proportion to the vote which avoids “wasted votes” 
for the voters. PR is a fairer system in which people feel less alienated. Moreover, as 
Duverger suggests there is a consistent relationship between elections and party 
                                                                                                                                               
Arend Lijphart also says the problem of inequality can be solved by maximizing 
turnout, which can be done with instrumental motivations such as voter-friendly 
registrations rule, proportional representation, infrequent elections, weekend voting, 
compulsory voting and less salient election with the most important national election.  
Arend Lijphart, “Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma”, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol.91, No.1, (Mar, 1997), pp.1-14 
Miller and Niemi on the other hand, combine both individual-level approach and 
instrumental level approach in explaining the voting decision. According to them 
“voters’ choices are constrained by the electoral system and limited range of voting 
options available and conditioned by the social and geographic context in which voters 
live and by the way in which politics is presented to them”. “Voting: Choice, 
Conditioning and  Constraint”, Comparing Democracies 2: new challenges in the study 
of elections and voting , edited by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, Pippa Norris., 
(London: Thousand Oaks, 2004).  
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systems: plurality leads to two-party system and proportional representation (PR) leads 
to multiparty system. The increased number of parties increases the variety of options 
for people to choose. Therefore, in the countries applying PR electoral systems, there 
are many members to be elected in each district, most parties have a chance to win a 
seat, and they attempt to mobilize electors which increase the salience of elections and 
competitiveness in the party system.  
 
The study by IDEA supports the statement above and signifies that voter turnout is 
influenced by the electoral system (Plurality; Semi-PR, and PR) and the 
competitiveness of electoral politics (whether largest party wins less or more than 50%); 
which determine the salience of election in the words of Franklin. As IDEA indicates 
“there does seem to be a clear link between voter turnout and the competitiveness of 
electoral politics in a political system. In the 542 elections where the largest party won 
less than half of the vote turnout was a full 10% higher than the 263 elections where a 
single party won over 50% of the popular vote”57.           
 
 Franklin explains low turnout level in Switzerland (despite its high level of 
education and list-PR electoral system) also with regard to low salience of elections in 
these countries, because “its elections do not determine the political complexion of the 
government that takes office”58. In Switzerland since 1947, the same government has 
always taken office no matter what the balance of political forces in the parliament. 
Because the government coalition is based on a prior agreement among the three largest 
parties, not on the choices of the voters, this creates an incentive for the citizens not to 
vote who knows their vote will not change the governmental result. In other words, the 
elections are not important or effective in the formation of the government, and the 
votes of the electorates are not decisive.  
 
Moreover, it should be noted that depolarization and a decline in party-
identification also has an impact on reducing competitiveness in plurality and majority 
electoral systems in which mainly two ideologies, rightist and socialist parties struggle 
                                                 
57 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Electoral 
Participation, http://www.idea.int.  
 
58 Franklin, “What Role for Compulsory Voting?”, p. 214.   
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in elections. As polarization decreases overall, and cleavages change these parties move 
to the center rather than edges on the ideological spectrum.  
 
Rational choice theory supports this result, because in PR electoral systems P and 
B determinants of the theory is higher compared to plurality system. However, even 
though rational choice theory successfully explains and predicts the effects of 
institutional motivation variables on electoral participation, it fails to explain why in 
countries applying PR electoral systems people do not vote, or in plurality people do. 
This suggests the limit of rational choice theory. At that point, besides institutional 
motivations, individual-level variable also should be considered in order to explain the 
motivation for voting in a single country. Therefore, although Franklin criticize the 
studies on individual-level variables for ignoring institutional motivations, and argues 
they cannot explain the cross-national differences, individual-level determinants are 
supplementary to analyze cross-national differences, and especially institutional 
motivations.  
 
In addition, it is not only electoral systems but election types (national, 
local/municipal, and supra-national, presidential, parliamentary / legislative) which 
influence voter turnout as well. The comparisons are made mostly between national and 
local elections and legislative and presidential elections.  
 
According to the electoral studies of IDEA59, parliamentary (legislative) and 
presidential election turnout rates have been converging since 1945. Between 1945 and 
1950, parliamentary elections could expect almost twice as many voters turning out than 
at presidential ones. While presidential elections throughout the 1950s, 60s and 70s 
were characterized by lower average turnout rates than parliamentary elections, things 
have progressed to the point where they are now virtually indistinguishable. This has 
corresponded with an increase in the relative proportions of presidential elections.  The 
number of presidential elections, which once were less than 30% of the corresponding 
number of parliamentary elections, now makes up over 50% of this figure.  
 
                                                 
59 IDEA, http://www.idea.int.  
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In France, which has both parliamentary and presidential elections, the turnout 
ratio in recent presidential elections is higher than the turnout ratio in the recent 
parliamentary elections. The reason for this situation again can be explained by 
Franklin’s study which says as the salience of election competitiveness increases so 
does the electoral turnout. In France, the second round of the election is more 
competitive and important because people believe their vote can influence the outcome 
of politics. The competitive presidential election between Chirac and LePen can be 
given as an example. In addition, in the recent elections of May 2007, competitive 
second round elections between rightist Sarkozy and socialist Royal drew an 84% voter 
turnout in France, which is a significantly high participation rate if Table 1.1 is 
analyzed. On the other hand, in this electoral system (majority), again the 
proportionality of the votes is ignored. Each district has one seat in the parliament. This 
means due to two round systems the probability of “wasted vote” is lower, and the 
salience of elections are higher than plurality system, however the “wasted vote” 
possibility is higher than proportional representative electoral system.  
 
The comparison between national and local (municipal) elections also signifies the 
impact of election type on voter turnout and voting behavior of the electorates. As 
mentioned before, rational choice theory would predict that turnout will be higher in 
elections where the stakes and the probability of casting a decisive vote are the greatest. 
Statistics also demonstrate that voter turnout is lower in local elections than national 
elections. The reasons for this difference can be explained by behavior of the electorates 
who perceive national elections to be more salient than local elections. Moreover, as 
said before the time difference between local and national elections is also important in 
affecting turnout of the election. Morlan argues that “it appears that the countries in 
which the highest municipal turnout occurs are those in which local elections are the 
most nationally politicized, in terms of both issues and party activity”60. If local 
elections occur before than the national election, the politicization of the local election 
is expected to increase. Blais points out the importance of the media as another reason 
for the gap between national and local elections, suggesting that “national elections are 
                                                 
60 Robert L. Morlan, “Municipal vs. National Elections Voter Turnout: Europe and the 
United States”, Political Science Quarterly Vol. 99, (1984), pp.457-70.  
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more widely covered in the media, [and] citizens are much more likely to hear on the 
news about a national campaign than about a local one”61.  
 
On the other hand, studies on local and national elections focus only on the 
election type of these elections but ignore the electoral system structure of these 
elections. For instance, in Turkey the 1960 elections different systems were used to 
illustrate this point.  The national elections used PR, the “mayor of municipality” 
elections used plurality, where “members of provincial council” used PR. As expected, 
voter turnout in “mayor of municipality” is significantly lower compared to “members 
of provincial council”, which is as high as the national electoral participation rate.  
 
For compulsory voting (a sanction is applied for failure to vote), although Lijphart 
thought that making the voting compulsory could be a solution to the decline and can 
maximize the voter turnout by minimizing the free-rider problem, a somewhat 
surprising result of Franklin’s study is that the nations which have some element of 
compulsion associated with voting have only a small lead in turnout over the other 
nations without any compulsory voting laws. However, he claims similar to degree of 
proportionality of electoral outcomes, the presence of postal voting and weekend 
(Sunday) voting and compulsory voting also has a positive effect on turnout. In addition 
to Franklin, in his comprehensive and impressive work To Vote or Not To Vote62Andre 
Blais, after analyzing assumptions of previous studies on voter turnout, asserts that there 
is one consistent result of the studies which suggests “turnout is substantially higher in 
countries with compulsory voting”.   
 
         In his study, Andre Blais categorizes cross-national variations in three main 
variable types: the socioeconomic environment; the institutional setting and party 
systems. Besides Franklin’s works on voter turnout, this thesis will also utilize Blais’ 
study, and test his hypothesis in his work for Turkey, which would enable one to 
compare and contrast Turkey’s electoral participation property with other countries, and 
help to locate its position within the voter turnout literature.  
                                                 
61 Blais, To Vote or Not to Vote, p. 39.  
 
62 Ibid., p. 21.  
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          Socioeconomic variables that are expected to influence the electoral participation 
of citizens (the ones that Blais considers) include: GNP per capita, growth of GNP per 
capita, average life expectancy, degree of illiteracy, size of population and the 
population density63. These variables identify the socioeconomic situations of the all 
countries, apart from individual resources. Similar to individual resources such as 
income, education level and age; turnout is affected positively by GNP per capita, 
growth of GNP per capita, density of population and negatively by average life 
expectancy, degree of illiteracy and size of population. This suggests that a country that 
has a higher GNP per capita is expected to have a higher voter turnout, everything else 
being equal. On the other hand, it should be noted that the impact of the economy is the 
variable that has been the most extensively studied in the literature.  
 
       Blais asserts that “turnout depends not only on social and economic factors but also 
on how elections and politics more broadly are structured”64. he identifies five 
institutional features that appear particularly worthy of examination. These institutional 
setting variables are also similar to Franklin’s institutional motivations. They are 
compulsory voting, electoral system, voting age, degree of democracy, and decisiveness 
of elections. Within this category, turnout is affected positively by compulsory voting 
(most effective determinant), decisiveness (salience of election in Franklin’s study), 
voting age, and PR electoral systems, whereas they are negatively affected by the 
degree of democracy, plurality and majority electoral system.  
 
         Blais considers two features for the party system to be tested in cross-national 
level: number of parties (running in the election, effective number of electoral and 
legislative parties), and competitiveness65. Both of the variables influence voter turnout 
negatively. It is mentioned above that in PR systems the number of parties are high, 
which brings the competitiveness that increases the mobilization of people and salience 
                                                 
63 The number of people by squared kilometers of territory.  
 
64 Ibid. p.26.  
 
65 The measure of closeness is the gap (in vote shares) between the leading and the 
second parties.  
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of the election, and consequently is expected to lead to an increase in voter turnout. 
Here, Blais’ study suggests that if the number of parties in the elections is high, this can 
cause complexity for the electorates to choose among the parties, and reduce the 
intension to vote. For competitiveness, as the gap between the leading and the second 
party increases, voter turnout is expected to decrease due to lack of competition.  
 
 The third type of voter turnout study is made by nation-wide analysis. These 
analyses also examine the same variables of cross-national level analysis. However their 
main focus is to search and investigate the turnout fluctuations within a country. In 
order to measure whether turnout fluctuate or not in a country, they calculate how much 
turnout in a given election differs from turnout in the previous election in the same 
country. Table 1.1 and 1.2 given above enables one to interpret the fluctuations within 
the countries and in cross-national level as well, within 10 year periods. In Table 1.1 it 
is noted that fluctuations within a country are relatively small compared to cross-
national variations. For the Turkish case in Table 1.2, fluctuations are higher compared 
to other Western democratic elections. Moreover, although short-term fluctuations 
(between two elections) would be relatively small to interpret and observe the social and 
political changes, analyzing electoral result differences in terms of each decade enables 
one to observe the trend in voter turnout.  
 
 The trend in Western democracies indicates that voter turnout started to decline 
after 1980s. As explained above social and political changes in Europe especially 
depolarization and a decrease in party-identification can be given as the reasons for this 
reduction. On the other hand, the Turkish case suggests the opposite in which voter 
turnout significantly increased after the 1980s. (It should be noted that after the 1980 
military coup, polarization between left and right ideology also decreased. Political 
parties and politicians were exiled from politics, and thus party-identification 
diminished). Moreover GNP per capita declined significantly. Despite these social, 
economical and political challenges, there was a significant increase in voter turnout 
from 72, 4% (1977) to 92, 3% (1983). This demonstrates the impact of establishing 
compulsory voting with 1982 Constitutional Law or the motivation of people to vote for 
democracy after three years of military governance.  
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As examples of countries (Turkey, France, and Switzerland) indicate, in order to 
explain electoral participation design of a country, many types of analysis (individual, 
nation-wide and cross-national level) should be evaluated and many variables must be 
considered. Therefore, we cannot suggest that only one type of analysis or variable is 
efficient and sufficient to explain the motivation of individuals to participate in the 
elections.  As indicated before, even Switzerland has high level of education, income 
and has a list-PR electoral system as Turkey; its turnout level is the lowest ratio within 
the European countries. Here PR electoral system (institutional setting variable) and 
level of education and GNP per capita (socioeconomic environment variables) fail to 
rationalize low turnout in Switzerland.  
 
However if Turkey and the Netherlands are compared, (two countries applying PR 
electoral system), this time compulsory voting emerges as the explanatory factor for the 
turnout differences; due to the fact that Turkey adopted compulsory voting after 1980, 
and the Netherlands abolished compulsory voting in 1970.  Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 
show that, in the Netherlands before the abolishment of compulsory voting, in the 1960s 
the average voter turnout was 95%, and it declined to 83.5% in 1970s, whereas, in the 
case of Turkey, the application of compulsory voting helped to increase average voter 
turnout from 69.6% (in 1970s) to 92.8% (in 1980s). On the other hand, although the 
Netherlands abolished compulsory voting in 1970s, its level of turnout has always been 
higher than France, which has applied a majority electoral system. Then again the 
question is if in this case the electoral system is the main factor for identifying high 
turnout level in the Netherlands compared to France, why does turnout decrease in 
Turkey after changing the electoral system from plurality to PR electoral system in 
1960?   
 
  In order to identify the electoral participation structure of Turkey, it will be 
beneficial to evaluate the brief history of Turkish democracy and electoral participation 
pattern before testing the given variables within the literature at the nation-wide level.  
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CHAPTER II: TURKISH DEMOCRACY, ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION, and 
PARTY SYSTEMS 
 
 
In this chapter, first history of Turkish democracy will be given with regard to the 
changes in the electoral system, and then the electoral participation rate of national 
(general) and local (municipality) elections will be displayed. Within these elections, 
two of them in which the electorates vote for general and local elections in the same 
year (1977 and 1999) will be selected, and some of the variables that determine voter 
turnout (mentioned in literature review part) will be tested at the province level. Later, 
considering the high correlation between electoral and party systems, the vote shares of 
each party for national and local elections will be analyzed which enables to observe the 
alternations and continuities in the voting pattern behavior of the electorates. Lastly, 
volatility, fragmentation and the effective number of parties in Turkish general and local 
elections will be calculated and analyzed.  
 
 
I) The History of the Turkish Democracy and Changes in Electoral System 
 
 
a) 1950-1960 
 
In the political history of Republican Turkey, the first democratic election with 
regard to the definition of free and fair elections took place in 1950, an event which 
signifies the year of passing from a single party regime to democratic governance. 
Between 1923-1945, a single party Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası [Republican People’s 
Party-CHP] established by the founder of Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal governed 
the country. Before 1946, the elections were held in two phases: first the citizens (prior 
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to 1934, citizenry included only males) elected the candidates that would vote for the 
deputies, and then within these deputies, the leaders of the CHP appointed the 
appropriate individuals to the National Assembly. Therefore with the 1946 multiparty 
elections the electoral system changed from limited to full representative democracy. 
 
Moreover before 1950, three main attempts to adopt democratic regime can be 
identified: the establishment of Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası [Progressive 
Republican Party- TCF] in 1924; the establishment of Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası [Free 
Republican Party-SCF] and local election with the participation of SCF in 1930; and 
national (general) election in 1946 with the participation of Demokrat Parti [Democrat 
Party-DP]. These three attempts for democracy resulted with failure in application due 
to political and legislative repression of CHP towards the opposition parties. TCF was 
closed in 192566, SCF was forced to close itself by its founders67, and the 1946 national 
election cannot be announced as democratic due to the interventions of CHF68.  
 
It can be said that the center-periphery relations have formed the core of Turkish 
politics till the Ottoman period69 and have been shaped by the changes in the electoral 
system. Şerif Mardin claims that in the Early Republican Period with the Kemalist 
reforms (mostly the ones on secularism) the gap between the center and periphery 
                                                 
66 Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet: İkinci Grup/ Opposition in the First 
Assembly: The Second Group, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2003;  Erik Jan Zürcher, 
The Progressive Party 1924-1925, (E.J.Brill, 1991).  
 
67 Cemil Koçak, Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası/ The Incumbent and 
Free Republican Party with Documents, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2006).  
 
68 Votes were given openly, but counted secretly in contrast to the democratic way of 
secret voting, and open counting.  
 
69 Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish. Politics?,” Daedalus, 
no. 102 (1973). 
Sabri Sayarı, “Some Notes on the Beginnings of Mass Political Participation in 
Turkey”, in Engin D. Akarlı with Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.). Political Participation in 
Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems, (Bebek, Istanbul: Boğaziçi 
University Pub., 1975), pp.121-133.  
Sabri Sayarı asserts that “party patronage and clientalist politic have remained 
characteristic features of electoral competition although conflict between parties 
increasingly tended on ideological differences”.  
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increased. Ayşe Ayata70 also asserts that the dependency of the periphery on the center 
always exerts significant endurance and proliferation of personal dependencies in the 
form of patron-client relationships71, and she adds that “being cut off from the periphery 
[was] a positive value until 1946”72; because there was no political competition or 
democracy, elites did not go to their constituencies even for votes. In the single-party 
period, periphery’s only relation with center was paying taxes and military service. 
Therefore, the only way to integrate the periphery with the center was to use the 
existing notables, to co-opt them into the political system. In this system, the notables 
first elected the representatives and then the representatives elected the deputies. In 
other words, the deputies in the parliament were assigned by the Kemalist elites (most 
directly by Mustafa Kemal). Hence, DP’s emergence changed the political patronage, 
due to fact that now elected representatives became extremely accessible and act 
according to personal demand, and the voters had the power of direct bargaining with 
the candidates and parties. 
 
In the multiparty period, DP, by advocating liberalism, equality, freedom of 
speech and the rule of the people, began to represent the periphery against the 
representatives of the center (CHP). In the general elections from 1950 to 1960, the 
plurality electoral system was used, and in three national elections namely 1950, 1954, 
and 1957 DP came in power as the ‘predominant party’73 with 55,2%, 58,4% and 48,6% 
share of the votes respectively.  
 
                                                 
70 Ayşe Güneş Ayata, “Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey”, Democracy, 
clientelism, and civil society (ed.) by Luis Roniger & Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, (Boulder, 
Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1994). 
 
71 Sabri Sayarı, “Political Patronage in Turkey”, in E. Gellner and J Waterbury (eds.) 
Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, (Duckwpth, 1997).   
According to Sayarı, “political patronage” refers to a particular form of reciprocal 
exchange whereby individual patrons and/or political parties seek to mobilize the 
support of their followers in return for assistance and various brokerage services.  
 
72 Ayata, Roots and Trends of Clientelism, p.50. 
 
73 Sabri Sayarı, “The Changing Party System”, in S.Sayarı and Y. Esmer (eds.), Politics, 
Parties and Elections in Turkey, (Boulder, CO : Lynne Rienner Pub, 2002).  
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In 27 May 1960, Turkish democracy was interrupted by a military coup which 
accused DP and its politicians as being un-democratic, and claimed the military coup 
was done in the name of freedom of speech and democracy. DP was outlawed, its 
leadership banned from politics and its founder (also the former Prime Minister) Adnan 
Menderes executed with the Minister of Foreign Affair Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and the 
Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan by a military edict for violating the constitution. 
After DP was closed, it had been re-established with the name of Adalet Partisi [Justice 
Party-AP].  
 
The plurality electoral system which requires the “winner takes all” system had 
been seen as the reason for the repressive power of DP in the parliament and on society. 
Therefore, as a caution against the probability of undemocratic governance, the 1961 
Constitutional Law replaced the plurality electoral system with the proportional 
representative (PR) electoral system which created multiparty system in the National 
Assembly, and increased the level of fragmentation in the party system during the early 
1960s.  
 
 
b) 1960-1980 
 
With the PR electoral system, competition increased between parties for gaining 
electoral votes. The change in the electoral system also altered the rule of the political 
game of the patron-client relationship. As Ayata asserts, in the AP period, various spoils 
are used to create loyal supporters in the periphery. With urbanization, AP carries rural 
political structure into the cities, areas where immigrants are concentrated. Moreover, 
during those years, modernization increased class-based politics and ideological 
tendencies in society. 
 
In the first democratic election (1960) after the military coup of 1960, 
approximately 20% vote shares of CHP and DP was distributed to other parties, a 
change which signifies the role of the military coup in the increase of volatility and 
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destruction of political socialization74 in the Turkish political system. However, despite 
the military coup (except for the national election of 1961), AP gained the majority of 
the votes in 1965 and 1969 elections, and became the most successful party of 1960s.  
 
According to the general assumptions of the literature review given above, voter 
turnout is expected to be higher in countries with a PR electoral system than in the 
countries with a plurality electoral system. Here, the alternation in the electoral system 
from plurality to PR electoral system in Turkey with the 1961 Constitution did not 
increase the rate of electoral participation in Turkish national elections. In contrast a 
reduction in voter turnout is observed if the average participation in 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s is compared (Table 1.2).  
 
Towards the ends of 1960s, ideological polarization between leftist and rightist 
political views became dominant in the voting decision of the electorates, especially 
those living in the urban cities, whereas the patron-client relationship continued in the 
rural areas. In 12 March 1971, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) declared a statement 
asserting that if the political parties could not prevent the anarchic conditions and 
struggle between the Turkish leftist and rightist youth, the military would handle the 
administration directly. This statement is accepted as the second military coup in the 
history of Republic of Turkey. After this military coup, not the major parties but only 
the small Marxists Türkiye İşçi Partisi [Turkish Labor Party-TİP] and Islamist Milli 
Nizam Partisi [National Order Party- MNP] were banned by the Constitutional Court75. 
However in the 1973 national election, it is seen that AP lost significant share of votes: 
a Pro-Islamist party Milli Selamet Partisi [National Party-MSP] received the 11,8% of 
the votes in this election, a percentage which signifies that people began vote for 
extremist parties rather than the parties closer to the center.  
 
Whereas, competition between CHP (leftist) and AP (rightist) increased again in 
1977 national election, where they obtained 41,4% and 36,9% share of the votes 
                                                 
74 Political Socialization is the process whereby individuals become aware of tenets of 
political culture, political facts, and political values. It happens through the influence of 
parents, the media, friends, employment and a variety of other stimuli. 
 
75 Sabri Sayarı, “The Changing Party System”, p.15. 
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respectively. In 12 September 1980, Turkish Armed Forces interrupted Turkish 
democracy for the third time, and seized the political governance in Turkey. All of the 
former political parties were closed, and politicians banned from politics.  
 
 
c) 1980-Present 
 
The 1982 Constitutional Law made two changes in the electoral system which 
altered the voting behavior of electorates and rule of politics for political parties and 
politicians. First by considering the low electoral participation rate of the 1977 general 
elections (Table 2.1 below), in 1982 Turkey adopted a new constitution and new 
election law, which defined the act of voting as “mandatory”. Those who failed vote 
could be subject to punishment, if the eligible voter in question failed to declare a 
credible excuse, such as serving in the army, as soldiers have been exempt from voting 
since 198376. Second, by considering the uprising political demands of ethnic minorities 
(especially Kurds), in order to prevent their entrance to the Parliament, the electoral 
threshold increased to a 10% level. This high national threshold requires that any party 
that takes less than 10% of the general votes cannot enter to the National Assembly and 
the votes given to them be distributed among the other parties that manage to pass the 
threshold.  
 
As outlined in the literature review section, a debate on the influence of the 
electoral systems on fairness and stability in politics exists. The debate concludes that 
PR electoral system brings fairness because the voted ballots are less likely to be wasted 
on the reflection of the votes to the distribution of seats in the National Assembly and 
different ideologies can be represented in the Parliament. However, the plurality 
electoral system leads to a two-party system in which the winner takes the all, and the 
votes given to the unsuccessful party will be wasted. On the other hand, the two-party 
system brings stability to the politics for supporting by one-party government. By 
raising the national threshold to 10% in 1982, Constitutional law aims to decrease the 
number of parties in the Parliament, prevent unsuccessful coalition government and 
                                                 
76 Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest 
and Stability in an Islamic Society, (I.B.Taurus: New York, 2007), p. 16.  
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establish more powerful governments that bring stability in politics and economics.  
However, with regard to this debate the alternation of the electoral law damages the 
fairness qualification of the PR electoral system (in which the probability of wasting a 
vote is lesser compared to the ineffectiveness of the plurality system) as well. Here, 
votes given to minor parties are wasted, and the parties that pass the 10% national 
threshold get the number of seats that are higher than their proportion of votes. Due to 
the high threshold, the electoral system stays in between PR and plurality system in 
which the electorates intend to vote strategically (against their less favored) rather than 
voting for their most preferred party (if it is certain that it cannot pass the threshold).  
 
As the result of these regulations, after 1980 with the adoption of compulsory 
voting, voter turnout in both national and local elections has increased in a significant 
ratio. Ideological depolarization is aimed and established, whereas it also has brought 
the rise of pro-Islamist parties as a major force in electoral and parliamentary politics77. 
According to Sayarı  
 
From the military perspective, democratic stability in Turkey required the 
establishment of a new system based on new parties that would have no continuity with 
the pre-1980 parties. According to the military’s scenario, this new party would be 
based on two moderate, centrist parties, and it would exclude the extremist radical 
leftist, ultranationalist, and Islamist parties78.  
 
 
However, in the 1990s, fragmentation in the party system is returns, and the 
political polarization between left and right ideologies is replaced by a struggle between 
the center-left parties, and similarly between center-right parties, a struggle which 
creates the weakening of political center and benefited the extremist parties. 
Paradoxically, high volatility encourages more and more new parties to enter to the 
elections every time, because they perceive they can obtain some share from the 
previous votes of the other parties, or the advantage of the protest votes which are given 
                                                 
77 Ibid. pp. 32-34. The study of Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu displays the progression of 
the collapse for the centre left and right parties, and the rise of the extreme-right wing 
parties to a dominant position because of the zero-sum nature of elections in the Turkish 
context.  
 
78 Sayarı, “The Changing Party System”, p.15.  
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to punish the economical and political failures of the previous government. However, 
due to the entrance of the new parties fragmentation leads to fragmentation and 
volatility increases as well.  
 
Moreover, high fragmentation and volatility in Turkish national elections also 
affects the patron-client relationship. High volatility suggests that a winning party in an 
election may not obtain the same vote shares for the following elections, or even may 
not enter to the Parliament. However, in order to pursue the benefits of patronage and 
bring the promised services to the clients a party needs to remain in the power. This 
situation has created an incentive for the political parties to do whatever it takes them to 
stay in the power. Making negative politics (blaming and blackening of other parties) 
replaced making positive politics (bragging of their contributions etc.).  
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, polarization between the ideologies has begun to 
rise again, but this time it has been based on the growing conflict between the Islamists 
and secularists. As a result of this conflict, and the increasing power of Islamist parties, 
on 28 February 1997 National Security Council gave a “civil note” to the DYP-RP 
coalition government which targeted RP [Welfare Party-RP] and accused it for 
involving radical religious actions in political life. This “civil note” can be accepted as 
the forth intervention to the process of Turkish democracy.  
 
The note given by the Turkish Armed Forces on 27 April 2007 to the pro-Islamist 
incumbent party Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice and Development Party-AKP] can 
also be explained within the frame of the conflict between secularist and Islamist 
politics. TSK declared that it gave this note to AKP for dragging the country into 
tension in the period of presidential selection79. Although the note was not a written one 
                                                 
79 Several protest marching has happened against the President candidate Abdullah Gül, 
who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in pro-Islamist AKP government. The 
protesters and opposition parties insisted that the President should be a secular person 
selected out of the National Assembly. AKP insisted on the candidacy of Gül, and after 
the note of military in 27 April 2007 (the army's April 27th threat to intervene over the 
choice of a president whose wife wears the Muslim headscarf.), the Constitutional Court 
confirm the verdict that to select a President 367 “yes” votes from the Assembly should 
be achieved. Because AKP cannot maintain 367 votes by itself, and it cannot 
compromise with the other parties in the Parliament, early election decision is given 
(instead of 4 November 2007 it is taken to 22 July 2007).  
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but displayed on the website of TSK, the gesture is noted as the fifth main intervention 
of military into the Turkish democracy. This event also brings the question of whether 
democracy can be sacrificed for retaining secularism80.   
 
          In conclusion, in Turkish (Republican) political history before 1950, we observe 
three main interventions to attempts for democracy, and after 1950 five interventions 
and interruptions to Turkish democracy have been experienced. Ironically, each 
intervention has been attempted to be legitimized by claiming they have been made in 
the name of democracy and establishing stability and transition in the country. 
However, each intervention has damaged the political socialization process of the 
individuals, and has prevented the establishment of a consolidated democracy in 
Turkey. Members of the parliament were selected and governments formed with regard 
to the popular vote however, the intervention of military coups and notes has blocked 
the democratic use of the popular vote to overturn unsuccessful governments.  
 
 
II) Electoral Participation in Turkish National and Local Elections 
 
 
a) Voter Turnout 
 
Local elections in Turkey cover four different layers of local administration. These 
are members of provincial council elections, the mayor of municipality elections, 
members of municipal council elections, and mayor of greater municipality elections 
(only for the greater cities). For this study, in the comparison of national and local 
elections, members of provincial council and mayor of municipality elections are 
included in the dataset. The reason for this selection is that since 1963 members of 
provincial council elections have used proportional representative electoral system and 
the mayor of municipality elections have used the plurality electoral system. Therefore, 
merging the national and these two local administration elections within the same 
                                                                                                                                               
 
80 Secularism v. Democracy, From The Economist print edition, 3 May 2007, 
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9116841  
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dataset enables to test and analyze the effect of electoral system (plurality vs. PR) and 
election type (national vs. local) on electoral participation rate.   
         
Table 2.1: Voter turnout in Percentage for National, Members of Provincial 
Council and Mayor of Municipality Elections  
 
Election Year National Elections Members of Provincial 
Council  
Mayor of Municipality 
1950 89,3   
1954 88,6   
1957 76,6   
1961 81,4   
1963  77,6 69,3 
1965 71,3   
1968  65,7 59,4 
1969 64,3   
1973 66,8 61,7 56 
1977 72,4 60,4 53,1 
1983 92,3   
1984  91,0 85,6 
1987 93,3   
1989  81,5 78 
1991 83,9   
1994  92,2 90,5 
1995 85,2   
1999 87,1 86,9 85,2 
2002 79,1   
2004   75,28 71,7 
Average 80,82 76,92 72,08 
 
Literature review on voter turnout indicates that voter turnout is expected to be 
higher in national elections compared to municipality elections. This difference in the 
voter turnout is mostly explained by the situation that the stakes involved in municipal 
politics are relatively small, and that parties and voters generally do not attach much 
importance to the local elections. Table 2.1 displays that this assumption is also feasible 
for Turkish national and local elections. For the national elections since 1950, the 
average voter turnout is 80,82 which is accepted as relatively high compared to the 
electoral participation rate of Western democratic countries as given in Table 1.1.  
 
In the Table 2.1, voter turnout of mayor of municipality and members of 
provincial council elections since 1963 is given. When these two types of municipality 
elections are compared, it is clearly seen that the voter turnout in members of provincial 
council elections is higher than the voter turnout in mayor of municipality elections. 
This difference can be explained by the variable of electoral system, because according 
to the studies mentioned in the literature review, electoral participation is expected to be 
higher in PR electoral systems compared to that in the plurality electoral systems.  
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On the other hand, Table 2.2 displays that despite the election type and electoral 
system differences (institutional setting determinants) within these three elections, there 
is a common pattern of fluctuations of voter turnout in both Turkish national and local 
elections.   
 
Table 2.2 Average Turnout since 1950 in Turkish National and Local Elections 
Turkey/percent 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s* 
National Elections 
Average 
84.8 72.3 69.6 92.8 83.8 
Members of Provincial 
Council Elections 
Average 
 71,65 61,05 86,25 84,79 
Mayor of Municipality 
Elections Average 
 64,35 54,55 81,8 82,47 
Notes: * includes 2002 national election and 2004 local election as well.  
Source: State Statistic Institute and www.yerelnet.org.tr 
 
In the 1950s, voter turnout in national elections is seen to be very high with the 
ratio 84,8 %. The reason for this high participation rate can be due to the enthusiasm of 
the public for passing to the democratic governance regime in 1950 (first free and fair 
elections) after the single party regime period of 1923-1946. In this thesis the electoral 
participation rate of 1950 and 1955 local elections is not included due to inconsistent 
data, which only gives voter turnout in some cities, but not the nation-wide results. In 
the 1960s, average voter turnout in national elections decreased more than 10%, and 
average participation rate in members of provincial council elections was highly close 
to this ratio. In the 1970s, voter turnout for all the elections decreased, but significantly 
in local elections by 10%. The downfall in voter turnout in the 1970s corresponded with 
the participation rate in the other European countries. From the 1970s to the 1980s, a 
significant jump in electoral participation is observed, especially in the mayor of 
municipality elections. As mentioned above, after the 1980 military coup, compulsory 
voting has been adopted and this ascent in voter turnout can be explained by this 
institutional setting variable. Here, the application of compulsory voting emerges as the 
most significant determinant that has affected the voter turnout. During the 1980s, voter 
turnout in national elections was still higher than the two kinds of the local elections, 
and the participation rate in members of provincial elections exceeded the ratio in 
mayor of municipality elections. Most importantly, as a result of increasing voter 
turnout in the local elections, the gap between national and local participation rates has 
narrowed.  
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However, interestingly, voter turnout in 1990s challenges the assumptions of the 
studies in the literature and the general pattern seen before. Participation in members of 
provincial council exceeds the voter turnout in national elections. Moreover, voter 
turnout in mayor of municipality elections gets closer to the level of national and 
members of provincial council elections which have PR electoral systems.  
 
Figure 2.1 below also shows the correlation between voter turnout of national and 
local elections, and their fluctuations within years. This correlation suggests several 
points for Turkish politics. First of all, their rises and falls within the same time period 
show that both of national and local elections are not influenced by the institutional 
setting variables, but determined by the socio-economical, and political conditions of 
Turkey. Second, there is a close relationship between them that vote shares of parties in 
local elections are perceived as the continuity of success of the parties that won the 
national elections. Third, in the 1980s, local elections became more important for the 
electorates, because of the rapid growth of urbanization that has radically transformed 
the social, economic, and political landscape of the country’s major cities81. As a result 
of this rapid rise of urban growth through migration to the cities from the villages and 
small towns in Anatolia, the importance of local elections, especially the metropolitan 
mayoral races in major Turkish cities has increased. Because it uses the plurality 
electoral system in which the winner takes the all, the mayor of municipality elections 
especially in greater cities became highly competitive. This competitiveness also has 
brought a growing differentiation in political party preferences both in the elections for 
different local administrative levels, and between municipal and parliamentary elections 
from the balloting in 199482. In the national and local elections held in 2000s, voter 
turnout has decreased for all of the elections as well, which signifies again a similar 
pattern of participation in both national and local elections.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Nihal İncioğlu, “Local Elections and Electoral Behavior”, in S.Sayari and Y. Esmer 
(eds.), Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey, 2002, p.73.  
 
82 Ibid. p.78.  
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Figure 2.1: Voter Turnout for National, Member of Provincial Council and Mayor 
of Municipality Elections 
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After the 1982 Constitutional Law, national elections and local elections occur 
once in five years. As seen in the Table 2.1, only in 1973, 1977 and 1999 electoral vote 
for national and local elections in the same years83. Therefore, these elections are crucial 
because they give the opportunity to compare national and local elections by taking the 
socio-economic environment conditions constant. In 1973 and 1977 elections, voter 
turnout in local elections is relatively low compared to participation rate in national 
elections. However, in 1999 local and national elections are held also in the same day 
and voter turnout is almost same for all three types of elections. Voter turnout in the 
2000s has regressed back to the level of 1960s.  
 
In order to analyze the influence of rapid urbanization on the voter turnout in local 
elections, and its relation with the other variables, national and local elections (both 
mayor of municipality and members of provincial council) held in 1977 and 1999 are 
selected and will be examined in detail in the following section.   
 
 
                                                 
83 Although national elections are determined to be once in five years by law, as it is 
seen from the election years Turkey always faces with early elections. In 2007, the 
legislation to make national elections once in four years is passed from the Parliament 
and confirmed by the Constitutional Court.  
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b) Analyzing 1977 and 1999 National and Local Elections 
 
         i. Methodology: 
 
Here the multiple regression model will be utilized by using cross-sectional data 
of electoral participation rate of all provinces in national and local elections held in 
1977 and 1999. Within the national and local elections displayed in the Table 2.1, only 
1977 and 1999 elections will be analyzed at the provincial level, because in these years 
national and local elections were held in the same year, and considering that 
compulsory voting was added into the constitution after 1980 military coup, this 
selection also enables one to observe the effect of compulsory voting variable on the 
voter turnout of the provinces.  
 
The total observations will be 441 [(67x3) + (80x3)] which includes the data of 
67 provinces for 1977 national, mayor of municipality and members of provincial 
council; and data of 80 provinces for the same elections done in 1999. The effects of 
socio-economic variables (the proportion of urban population, proportion of urban 
population x Marmara-Aegean region, GDP per capita, and GDP per capita x Marmara-
Aegean region) and institutional setting variables (election type, electoral system and 
compulsory voting) on the voter turnout of provinces will be tested. Some of these 
variables are taken from Blais’s study mentioned in the literature review, however in 
order to analyze the influence of urbanization, and compare with regard to urban-rural 
differences, the variable of “proportion of city population”  and “Marmara-Aegean 
region” is also included. Marmara and Aegean regions are significant for this test 
because they the most industrially developed and urbanized regions in Turkey. The list 
of variables is given below in Table 2.3.  
 
It should be noted that these variables (excluding the proportion of city 
population, and Marmara-Aegean region and including party system variables) will be 
tested in nation-wide level in the next chapter, which leads this thesis study to compare 
Turkish case with those of other Western democracies and with the general results given 
in the literature review by referring to the assumptions of the rational choice theory.  
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Table 2.3: The List of Variables (National and Local Elections in 1977 and 1999 at 
Provinces-Level) 
Variable Name  Explanation Source 
Electoral Participation Participation rates of provinces 
at 1977 and 1999 national 
elections and local elections 
(both mayor of municipality and 
members of provincial council). 
Turnout indicates the percentage 
of those registered on the 
electoral list who cast a vote. 
For the electoral results of local elections in 
1999 and 1977 www.yerelnet.org.tr is 
benefited.  
  
Result of national elections are taken from 
http://www.konrad.org.tr/secim/index.php 
 
 
Proportion of Urban Population  
Proportion of urban population 
(population of municipal areas 
of the province and district 
centers) to the total population 
of the provinces.  
DIE, 2000 Census and DIE, 1975 Census 
Books.  
 
Marmara-Aegean Region  
A dummy variable categorizing 
the provinces according to the 
region they are located in.  
 
D=1 if the province is in 
Marmara-Aegean (West 
Anatolia) Region.  
D=0 if the province is in other 
regions (Black Sea, 
Mediterranean,  Central 
Anatolia, South East Anatolia, 
and East Anatolia) 
 
Proportion of Urban Population 
x Marmara-Aegean Region 
Measures how much a 1% 
increase in the proportion of 
urban population of a province 
located in the Marmara-Aegean 
region changes the electoral 
participation. 
 
 
GDP per capita (log) at 1987 
prices in TL.  
 
 
Logarithm of GDP per capita of 
the province at base 10.  
Taking the logarithm of these 
variables enables one to observe 
whether values of these 
variables are significant for 
changes in the dependent 
variable electoral participation 
rate.  
 
 
 
For 1999 results:  
www.die.gov.tr is used. 
 
For 1977 results:  
www.tek.org.tr 
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GDP per capita x Marmara- 
Aegean Region 
Measures how much a 1% 
increase in the GDP per capita 
of a province located in the 
Marmara-Aegean region 
changes the electoral 
participation. 
 
 
Election type 
 
A dummy variable indicating the 
type of elections.  
D=1 if the election type is 
national election 
D=0 if the election type is local 
election.  
 
 
Electoral System 
 
A dummy variable indicating the 
electoral system.   
D=1 for PR electoral system 
D=0 for Plurality electoral 
system  
 
 
For national elections 
http://www.konrad.org.tr/secim/index.php 
 
For local elections 
http://www.yerelnet.org.tr/ 
 
Compulsory voting 
 
A dummy variable 
D=1 if it is compulsory to vote 
D=0 if it is not compulsory to 
vote 
 
After 1982 Constitutional Law 
voting in both national and local 
elections became compulsory.  
 
 
  
According to this design84, for example the electoral result of the province Adana 
province in 1977 national election is labeled as adana-N7, for the variable of election 
type (national vs. local) it gets the value 1, for electoral system (PR vs. plurality) it gets 
value 1, and for compulsory voting it gets the value 0. These values are valid for the 
voter turnout of all provinces in 1977 national elections. Here, it will be beneficial to 
give the descriptive properties of the dependent and independent variables.  
 
 
                                                 
84 The dataset is given in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
1977 National election 67 64,00 84,10 74,2149 5,15456
1977 Mayor of municipality  election 
67 37,00 75,60 60,6761 7,52570
1977 Member of provincial council 
election 64
85 38,60 90,30 66,7461 8,33940
1999 National election 80 79,40 94,50 87,3975 3,83419
1999 Mayor of municipality  election 
80 74,90 93,40 85,4450 4,46919
1999 Member of provincial council 
election 80 79,20 94,50 87,2994 3,84409
Valid N (listwise) 64       
 
 
Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Proportion of Urban Population 
441 16,00 90,69 46,1177 15,99817
GDP per capita (log) 441 2,61 6,58 5,8973 ,66921
Valid N (listwise) 441       
Note: The descriptive statistics of dummy variables (Marmara-Aegean Region; Election type, 
Electoral System and Compulsory Voting) are excluded from the Table 2.5.  
 
 
        By using the statistical descriptive of the dependent variables given in Table 2.4 
indicates many evaluations about the socioeconomic structure of Turkey and its 
reflections on voter turnout can be realized. In 1977 national and local elections, the 
lowest participation rates (64%, 37% and 38,6% respectively) belong to the same 
province (the most industrialized and urbanized city of Turkey), İstanbul. The highest 
participation rate in the 1977 national election belongs to Bitlis (Eastern Anatolia 
region); in the 1977 members of provincial council election the highest participation 
rate belongs to Erzurum (Eastern Anatolia region); and in the 1977 mayor of 
municipality election the highest participation rate belongs to Burdur (Mediterranean 
region)86.  
 
Whereas, interestingly in 1999, Diyarbakır province located in the less developed 
Southeastern region of Turkey, and with a relatively low GDP per capita and literacy 
                                                 
85 Electoral participation result of Afyon, Kahramanmaraş and Şanlıurfa cannot be 
found in www.yerelnet.org.tr due to the fact that name of these provinces changed. 
They are labeled as missing variable in the dataset.  
 
86 Given in Appendix A.  
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rate has the lowest voter turnout in both national and local elections. The highest voter 
turnout in both national and local elections belongs to Burdur (Mediterranean region) 
which has high GDP per capita, and literacy rate whereas the proportion of urban 
population of the province is at medium level.  
 
According to the descriptive statistics of independent variables Gümüşhane (Black 
Sea region) has the lowest ratio of urbanization (16%), whereas both in 1975 and 2000 
İstanbul has the highest level of urbanization 68% and 90,69% respectively. For GDP 
per capita (log) variable, 2,61 ratio belongs to Ağrı (East Anatolia region) measured in 
1977; and the highest ratio 6,58 is measured at 1999 for the city Kocaeli (Marmara 
region).  
 
These statistics points out three important predictions:  
 
a. Urbanization and income level of the provinces are correlated and there is a big 
gap of these ratios between the provinces with regard to the regions. Most of the highly 
urbanized and economically developed provinces are located in the Marmara and 
Aegean regions. Moreover, Turkey experienced a significant jump in terms of GDP per 
capita and urbanization level when the 1977 and 1999 ratios are compared. However 
only using the evaluation of these descriptions is not relevant and sufficient in order to 
test the influence of the socioeconomical factors on the voter turnout. The following 
regression model will be utilized for this purpose.  
 
b. Provinces display similar voter turnout characteristics in national and local 
elections, considering in both of them, one city has the lowest participation rate and one 
city has the highest participation rate. In other words, if one city has the lowest voter 
turnout in a national election, its participation into the local elections stays at the lowest 
level as well. This assumption also supports the pattern given in Figure 2.1, in which it 
is observed that national and local elections have the same fluctuations within years 
with regard to the participation rates at nation-wide level.  
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c. According to the study of Ozbudun and Tachau (aforementioned in the 
literature review)87 which encompasses the national election in 1960s and 1973, voter 
turnout decreases in the more urbanized, industrialized and modernized provinces. 
Although 1977 national and local elections support this assumption, the statistical data 
measured in 1999 national and local elections asserts that voter behavior of the 
provinces with regard to their region and urbanization level has changed from 1970s to 
2000s. Here, the multiple regression model based on 441 observations comparing 1977 
and 1999 national and local elections at the province-level will be utilized to test 
whether the proportion of urbanization population of a province negatively or positively 
affects the electoral participation.   
 
 
ii. Regression Model and Findings:  
              
              
        With regard to the literature review and approach of rational choice theory given 
previously, the relationship between 6 independent variables and dependent variable 
(electoral participation rate) will be evaluated by testing the hypothesis below:  
 
1) The participation to elections is expected to increase as the proportion of urban 
population decreases. (Ozbudun & Tachau, 1975)  
2) The participation to elections is expected to decrease if the province located as 
the Marmara or Aegean region.  
3) The participation to elections is expected to increase as the GDP per capita 
increases. (Blais, 2000) 
4) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the election is a national 
election type. (Blais, 2000) 
5) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the election is held using 
a proportional representative electoral system.  (Blais, 2000) 
6) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the election constitutes 
compulsory voting. (Blais, 2000) 
                                                 
87 Ergun Ozbudun and Frank Tachau, “Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: 
Toward a Critical Realignment?”, International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 6 
No.4,  (1975).  
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Here, the hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are related if we consider the assumption of 
Ozbudun and Tachau mentioned in the literature review. They assert that Turkey is one 
of the countries where the rate of voting participation is higher in rural areas than voting 
is in the cities. In Turkey most of the highly urbanized and modernized cities are located 
in the Marmara and Aegean region. Moreover, these provinces are industrialized and 
possess higher GDP per capita levels compared to those of the other regions. In order to 
analyze the correlation between these three variables, two joint variables are included to 
the dataset: the proportion of urban population x Marmara- Aegean region; and the GDP 
per capita (log) x Marmara-Aegean region.  
 
Additional Hypothesis: 
   The following two hypotheses will be tested in this thesis study, whether: 
 
7) The participation to elections is expected to increase or decrease if the 
urbanization ratio of the province increases, and this province locates at the 
Marmara-Aegean region.  
8) The participation to elections is expected to increase or decrease as the GDP per 
capita of the province increases, and this province locates at the Marmara-
Aegean region.  
 
According to the given independent and dependent variables the regression model 
will be structured as below88:  
                                                 
88 EPR= Electoral participation rate, the dependent variable.  
    βConstant= The intercept of the regression line.  
    βUrban x XUrban= The coefficient of the variable (proportion of urban population) 
multiplied with the variable.  
    βGDP x XGDP = The coefficient of the variable GDP per capita (log), multiplied with 
the variable GDP per capita (log).  
    βET x DET= The coefficient of the variable Election type, multiplied with the dummy 
variable Election type.  
    βES x DES= The coefficient of the variable Electoral System, multiplied with the 
dummy variable Electoral System. 
    βc x Dc= The coefficient of the variable Compulsory Voting, multiplied with the 
dummy variable Compulsory Voting.  
    βU-M&A (XUrban x  DM&A)= The joint coefficient is multiplied with the variable 
(proportion of urban population) and the dummy variable Marmara-Aegean region. 
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 EPR= βConstant+ βUrban x XUrban + βGDP x XGDP + βET x DET+ βES x DES+ βc x Dc+ 
βU-M&A (XUrban x  DM&A)+ βGDP-M&A (XGDP x  DM&A)     
                                                                                                                         (2.1) 
 
Table 2.6: Regression Equation with Socioeconomic Environment, and 
Institutional Setting Variables at Province-Level89 
Coefficientsa
71,954 2,589 27,791 ,000
-,099 ,025 -,134 -3,894 ,000
-1,123 ,463 -,062 -2,426 ,016
3,470 ,665 ,138 5,221 ,000
3,763 ,665 ,150 5,663 ,000
22,661 ,733 ,953 30,927 ,000
-,134 ,044 -,257 -3,064 ,002
1,758 ,363 ,398 4,845 ,000
(Constant)
Proportion of Urban
Population
GDP per capita (log)
Electoral Type
Electoral System
Compulsory Voting
Urban Population &
Marmara_Aegean Region
GDP & Marmara-Aegean
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Electoral Participation Ratea. 
 
  
R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate F 
,775 ,771 5, 67283 184, 739 
 
R-square is 0,775, and that means the independent variables are good at predicting 
the dependent variable. F-statistic indicates the restrictions are significant at 5% and 1% 
level of confidence. The sign of the constant variable is positive as expected, and it is 
significant at 5% and 1 % levels.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
    βGDP-M&A (XGDP x  DM&A)= The joint coefficient is multiplied with the variable GDP 
per capita (log) and the dummy variable Marmara-Aegean region. 
 
89 Because the variable Marmara-Aegean region is not statistically significant in 
explaining the electoral participation it is excluded from the regression model. This 
exclusion did not cause any reduction in the R square value.  
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Evaluation of the hypothesis:  
 
1) The coefficient of the variable proportion of urban population indicates that there is 
a negative relationship between the urbanization ratio of a province and its electoral 
participation. If the urbanization ratio increases 1%, this change creates a decrease 
of approximately 10% for the provinces locate out of Marmara or Aegean region. If 
the province locates at the Marmara or Aegean region, a 1% increase in the 
urbanization ratio causes a 23,4% (10% + 13,4%) decrease in the voter turnout. T-
statistic value of the both variables (-3,894 and -3,064 respectively) indicates that 
these variables are significant in determining voter turnout at 1% level of 
confidence.  
 
For the influence of urbanization on the voter turnout there were contradicting 
assumptions. Individual-level analyses predict that as the individual resources of the 
electorate increases, the intention to vote is expected to increase. The descriptive 
statistics of the dependent variable given above suggest that for the 1999 elections 
voter turnout in the urbanized provinces also increases compared to 1977 electoral 
participation. In this thesis, aggregate data is used and the result of the regression 
model supports the study of Ozbudun and Tachau which asserts that in Turkey voter 
turnout decreases as the urbanization ratio increases. Moreover, the results display 
that geographical differentiation of the provinces influence voter behavior.   
 
2) The result of the regression model for the variable GDP per capita (log) indicates 
interesting predictions for Turkish case. If the province is not located at the 
Marmara or Aegean region, then the GDP per capita (log) affects negatively 
electoral participation rate, and when it increase by 1%, the voter turnout decreases 
by 1,12 %. On the other hand, the coefficient of the joint variable (GDP per capita 
(log) x Marmara-Aegean region) asserts that if the province is located at the 
Marmara or Aegean region, then when the GDP per capita increases 1%, this change 
causes an increase in the voter turnout by 0,6% (1,758-1,123). This increase is 
calculated by measuring the difference between the coefficient values of GDP. 
Marmara and Aegean region and GDP per capita (log) variables. Both variables are 
statistically significant in determining the electoral participation rate at 5% 
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significance level (-2,426 and 4,845 respectively). It should be noted that if the joint 
variable is excluded from the regression model (if the provinces are not examined in 
terms of the region), then a negative relationship between GDP per capita (log) and 
voter turnout is seen. However, then the variable becomes insignificant to explain 
the dependent variable90.   
 
Here, the finding of the regression model coincides with the literature review and 
the assumption of the rational choice theory which suggests that voter turnout is 
expected to increase as the GDP per capita increases.  
  
3) The coefficient of the variable election type signifies that if the elections are 
national elections, then the voter turnout increases about 3,5%. This variable is 
significant in explaining voter turnout at a 1% confidence level.  
 
Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1 interestingly show that in the 1990s and especially in the 
recent elections voter turnout in the local elections started to increase, the level of 
members of provincial council elections even exceeded the rate of national 
elections. Here, the result of the regression model for the election type coincides 
with the assumptions of the literature review that in national elections the 
participation rate is expected to be higher than that of local elections. Hence, it can 
be claimed that although local elections turn out to be more important for the 
Turkish electorates, especially for the urban dwellers after 1980s, due to the low 
participation rate in the 1977 local elections, here a positive influence of election 
type on voter turnout is observed. When the same variables are tested only for the 
1999 national and local elections, this time voting in a national election creates only 
                                                 
90 
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,068 ,013 ,132 5,235 ,000
(Constant)
Proportion of Urban
Population
GDP per capita (log)
Electoral Type
Electoral System
Compulsory Voting
Urban Population &
Marmara_Aegean Region
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
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a 1% increase in the voter turnout, and which is not statistically significant91. The 
Appendix C dataset also displays that for 1999 national and local elections (which is 
held on the same day 18 April) the participation rate is almost same for every 
province, suggesting that the date of the elections is also a salient parameter in 
addition to the differentiation between the election type and the electoral system.  
 
Interestingly, for only the year only, GDP per capita (log) affects the voter turnout 
positively in every region, and this effect increases when the province is at the 
Marmara or Aegean region.  
 
4) For the variable electoral system, it is seen that if the election uses PR electoral 
system then the electoral participation rate increases 3,76% compared to the rate of 
participation in the plurality electoral system. The electoral system is significant in 
determining the voter turnout at 1% confidence level. Note 95 indicates that the 
influence of the differentiation between the electoral systems reduces when it comes 
to the 1999 elections in which the participation rate in the mayor of municipality 
election (plurality electoral system) catches the level of the national and members of 
provincial council elections (PR electoral system).  
 
5) Within the variables, compulsory voting is the most effective one in determining the 
electoral participation by its 22,6% additional contribution. It is significant at 1% 
significance level, which corresponds with the assumptions of the literature review 
and the rational choice theory.  
 
If it is considered that the 1977 elections were the ones with the lowest participation 
rate since 1950 and afterwards (Figure 2.1) and compulsory voting was adopted 
                                                 
91 
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after 1980 military coup, the high impact of the compulsory voting can be explained 
due to this case.  
 
In the next chapter, the institutional setting variables (election type, electoral 
system, compulsory voting) will be tested and analyzed at nation-wide level for the 
national elections (1950-2002), and for the local elections (1963-2004). Using different 
dataset will enable one to compare the same variables at province level (cross-sectional 
data) and nation-wide level (time series data).  
 
 
III) Party System  
 
 
Discussion in the literature review section argues that within the electoral systems, 
electoral participation is expected to be higher in the PR electoral system. According to 
the studies of Franklin and Blais this difference emerges because in PR electoral 
systems competitiveness between the political parties is higher. Rational choice theory 
explains this in terms of the parameters B (benefit), P (probability to cast a decisive 
vote) as well as C (cost of voting) and concludes that P is expected to be higher in PR 
electoral systems because the electorates will know that their vote will not be wasted as 
it can be in plurality system. Duverger points at the consistent relationship between 
elections and party systems that plurality leads to two-party system and proportional 
representation (PR) leads to a multiparty system. Powell asserts that not the level of 
electoral participation but institutionalized party system is important to the process of 
democratic consolidation. This linkage suggests that although in the PR electoral system 
the representative participation (legitimacy of democracy) is expected to be higher, it is 
less likely to construct a consolidated democracy as compared to the plurality electoral 
system. Here, the thesis will examine the relationship between the electoral 
participation, the electoral system, and stability in democracy by focusing on the party 
system in Turkey and referring to the study by Powell.    
 
In his article Powell examines four conditions of political parties in order to show 
theoretical expectations about party- system attributes and measure the political 
performance. These party system attributes are strong party linkages to social groups; 
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strong support for extremist parties; fractionalization/multiparty systems; and volatility 
of support for parties.  
 
Strong party linkages are related to the modernization and industrialization level 
of the countries, and Powell asserts that in traditional societies, the mobilization of the 
electorates is more due to patron-client relations, whereas in modern, industrialized 
settings, the context of social life is vastly different from that in a traditional society, 
here occupations, education, and income level determine the party preferences. Voting 
along occupational lines would be infrequent as a basis of party division in the less 
modernized societies. In terms of the strong support for extremist parties, Powell says 
that proportional representation is expected to encourage linkages and extremism partly 
because it affects parties' choices of majoritarian or representational strategies, as well 
as because it facilitates appeals to geographically dispersed groups. In addition he 
makes an important prediction that minorities may also be a focus of majority-group 
fears, prompting members of the majority to support extremist parties.  
 
In Turkey as aforementioned, the patron-client relationship is developed mostly 
after the transition from plurality to the PR electoral system with the 1961 Constitution. 
The mobilization of the voter is extremely high mostly in the Southeastern region of 
Turkey where the feudal structure is dominant in the society, and patronage and 
clientelism are still effective tools for mobilizing support in the elections. Although 
Ozbudun and Tachau claim that highly modernized and industrialized provinces of 
Turkey intend to support more centralist and established parties via “political action” 
rather than “mobilization”, in the national and local elections of 1990s and 2000s it is 
seen that extremist parties (right-wing) begin to be selected by these provinces as well. 
The influence of transition to the PR electoral system for the support for the extremist 
parties is also valid in Turkey; these parties become successful especially in the 1990s 
and 2000s92. The closing of stable parties and banning their leaders from politics after 
the 1980 military coup damage political socialization, and unintentionally open the way 
to the extremist (nationalist and religious) parties. For example, the rise of ethnic 
tension between Turkish and Kurdish citizens during the 1990s, and the fugitive status 
                                                 
92 Vote share of the parties in national and local elections is given in the Appendix B. 
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of Abdullah Ocalan benefited the vote shares of the nationalist party Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi [Nationalist Action Party-MHP] in 1999 national elections which can be given as 
an example to Powell’s prediction about minority groups and support for extremist 
parties.  
 
 Within these four conditions, the most widely discussed property of party systems 
is their “fractionalization”: the degree to which they are dominated by a few parties or 
divided among many parties. Powell suggests that the two- party system leads to less 
fractionalization. Most observers view rapid changes in the pattern of support for parties 
as evidence of weakness in party systems. The volatility of the underlying pattern of 
citizen support for parties, therefore, is presumably a more important indication of party 
system weakness than are legislative outcomes. Hence the high ratio of fragmentation 
and volatility indicates the weakness of a party system and a problematic democracy 
functioning.  
  
         Below fragmentation and volatility in Turkish national and local elections are 
given in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. Effective number of parties (Figure 2.4) will be analyzed 
according to its relationship with fragmentation and volatility93.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Democracy Today, p. 36. 
Volatility index (V) is calculated by using i= 1,….N parties in the following formula: 
V= {(1/2) ΣN (│Vote percent i, t – Vote percent i, t-1│)}. The index lies between 0 and 1. 
V=1 represents a completely unstable system whereas V= 0 represents one where all 
parties obtained the same vote shares as they did in the previous election.  
The fractionalization index (F) is calculated by using election outcomes for i= 1,…N 
parties in the following formula: F= {(1- ΣN (Vote percent )2}. F varies between 0 and 1. 
It reaches a minimum of zero when one party receives all of the popular vote. As the 
number of parties receiving small electoral support increases the index will approach to 
one.   
Effective number of parties (ENP)= 1/ (1- Fractionalization Index).  
 
 61
 Figure 2.2: Fragmentation and Volatility in Turkish National Elections, 1950-2002 
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Figure 2.2 supports Sayarı’s assumption that the military intervention proved to be 
the main force in the fragmentation of the system94. It is clearly seen that after the 1960, 
and 1970 military coups, fragmentation increases, due to the fact that the parties 
positioning in the same ideological spectrum has begun to compete with each other, and 
this struggle caused the division of votes between the parties. After 1980 military coup, 
only three parties were allowed to run for the 1983 election; that situation explains the 
regression in the fragmentation index line at 1983. On the other hand, in the democratic 
national elections held in after each of the military coups (1961, and 1973) volatility is 
significantly increasing. The volatility in 1983 elections cannot be computed because 
the parties running for the elections were all new parties and they had no bounds with 
the previous parties. However, this sharp cut to the continuity of the parties was 
reflected in the volatility ratio of 1987 elections, in which the banned parties were 
replaced by their new names. In 1991, the systems turned back to the normal level, in 
which the major parties (ANAP, DYP, SHP and DSP) managed to continue their 
electorate support.  
 
One can ask why in some elections fragmentation decreases, but volatility 
increases or vis-a-versa if these two variables are related? In order to answer this 
question it is beneficial to examine the 1965 national elections (at Appendix B) in 
which fragmentation decreased from 0,7 to 0,6 and electoral volatility increased from 
                                                 
94 Sayarı, “The Changing Party System”, p.17. 
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0,15 to 0, 27. Here, fragmentation decreased because AP received the majority of the 
votes by a 52,9% vote share and CHP followed it by 28,7%. Hence, votes were 
distributed between two parties. However, compared to the previous 1961 national 
elections, CHP lost 8%, Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi [Republican Peasant’s 
Nationalist Party-CKMP] lost 11,8%, and Yeni Türkiye Partisi [New Turkey Party-
YTP] lost 10% of their votes, but AP increased its votes by 18,3%. These changes in the 
ratio of votes show that the votes of CHP and YTP went to AP, which signifies a rise in 
the volatility of the votes and preference of voters. Similarly, in 2002 national elections 
fragmentation decreased due to the distribution of votes between two parties (AKP and 
CHP), whereas because most of the old parties could not pass the threshold and the 
parties that formed the coalition government face a sharp fall in their votes (cannot pass 
the threshold), volatility in 2002 elections came to 0,6 level which was the highest ratio 
in Turkish history. During the 1990s, fragmentation increased because the number of 
parties running in the elections raised significantly (Figure 2.4), which causes the 
division of votes between many parties and leaded to coalition governments. However 
because these parties managed to continue their existence and none of the parties 
occurred to be the dominant party, volatility in the 1990s is seen stable.  
 
         In general although high volatility and fragmentation (compared to the Western 
democracies) in Turkish elections suggest that party system is fragile and is not 
institutionalized to provide a consolidated democracy, fluctuations in volatility signifies 
a more salient problem. Turkish electorates tend to vote with regard to the current 
socioeconomic and political events and with regard the performance of governments in 
managing with the problems, rather then their party preferences.   
 
In the thesis, fragmentation and volatility in Turkish local elections is also 
included in order to compare the pattern of voting in national and local elections. 
Moreover, because mayor of municipality elections use plurality electoral system, and 
members of provincial elections use the PR electoral system, this differentiation will 
enable the study to analyze whether the electoral system determines fragmentation and 
volatility structure in elections.  
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  Figure 2.3: Fragmentation and Volatility in Turkish Local Elections, 1963-2004 
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         In general it can be said that volatility and fragmentation index in members of 
provincial elections is higher than the index of mayor of municipality elections, which 
supports the assertion of Powell that fragmentation is more likely to occur in PR 
electoral systems. On the other hand, both of the local elections display a similar pattern 
with national elections in terms of the fluctuations in volatility and fragmentation index. 
However, comparison of the two figures suggests that fragmentation and volatility in 
national elections passes the level of index in local elections for the close election years. 
Because the electoral years of national and local years are different, it is beneficial to 
look at the 1973, 1977 and 1999 elections in both figures in order to analyze the 
similarities in the pattern of voting.  
 
Here, an interesting point should be noted by referring to the comparison of 
electoral participation rate in 1977 and 1999 elections outlined previously. To recall, 
voter turnout in national elections in 1977 has exceeded the participation in 1977 local 
elections, whereas towards the end of 2000s, local elections has became increasingly 
competitive and electoral participation in local elections turned out to pass voter turnout 
in national elections. Here, a similar pattern is seen for volatility and fragmentation 
index, in which in 1999 elections volatility in local elections exceeded the level of 
national elections and equality in the fragmentation level observed. Moreover, as 
mentioned in the evaluations of the regression model the election type difference 
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between the elections becomes less and less significant in determining voter turnout and 
volatility in the elections.  
 
In 1999, because national and local elections were held on the same day (18 April) 
voter turnout in these elections was highly close, almost equal for national and members 
of provincial council elections. This situation is expected, because the cost of voting for 
the electorates has decreased, they spend the same effort for going to the voting place 
for both national and local elections. To recall, Lijphart asserts that if the frequency of 
elections decreases, voter turnout is expected to rise. If the voter turnout in 1995-1999 
national elections and 1994-1999 local elections is compared (Table 2.1) the electoral 
participation increased for 1999 national election and decreased for 1999 local 
elections. This finding suggests that making the national and local elections in the same 
day does not increase the voter turnout; however electoral participations become similar 
for all elections.  
 
Hence, here by looking at the vote shares of the parties in the 1999 national and 
mayor of municipal elections (Appendix B), it can be analyzed whether the participants 
vote for the same parties for representation in the National Assembly and service by the 
municipalities.  It is seen that the vote share of the parties gathered in national and local 
elections are significantly different. CHP, ANAP, and FP (continues from RP) have 
managed to increase their votes in the local elections; whereas, mayor of municipality 
from the parties MHP and DSP were not as preferred as were their deputies. It is 
noticeable that only FP manages to continue its success in the vote shares of the mayor 
of municipality from the 1994 to 1999 local elections (from 19,07% to 18,4%), 
suggesting that although FP lost votes in national elections (from 21,4% to 15,4%), it is 
preferred for its services as mayor of municipality. This situation indicates urban 
dwellers regard quality (and satisfaction) of municipal services more than they do party 
preferences.  
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Below, Figure 2.4 displays the effective number of parties in Turkish national and 
local elections. Here, the national elections are colored as red, mayor of municipality 
elections as blue and members of provincial council as yellow95.  
 
Figure 2.4: Effective Number of Parties in Turkish National and Local Elections 
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 Figure 2.4 supports the assumptions outlined for volatility and fragmentation 
index of Turkey.  It is seen that in 1973 and 1977 the effective number of parties in 
national elections exceeds the number in local elections however; in 1999 the number of 
parties reached to an equal points (the highest in Turkish political history). The 
relationship between number of parties running in the elections and voter turnout will be 
examined in detail in the following chapters (in Figure 3.5 and Figure 4.4) as a 
determinant of party system variables.  
 
In conclusion, the multiple regression model testing the data at provincial-level 
and the evaluation of the volatility and fragmentation in Turkish party structure convey 
the result that Turkish electorate make his/her party preference with regard to the 
current socioeconomic conditions rather than considering their party loyalty. That is 
why as economic conditions worsen, voter turnout is increasing and as more 
unsuccessful the incumbent party, the volatility in the elections is more likely to 
increase. Although this chapter indicated a relationship between socioeconomic 
                                                 
95 These elections will be colored with the same identifying colors in the following 
figures located in Chapter III.  
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conditions and electoral volatility in Turkey, it cannot be said that there is a direct 
relation between them. From the voter turnout framework, it is certain that volatility and 
fragmentation level do not affect the electoral participation due to the fact that they have 
been measured after the elections; however both electoral volatility and voter turnout 
are influenced by the same determinants.  
 
It should be noted that in contrast to the Western democracies where voter 
turnout increases as the economic conditions improve, the regression equation showed 
that in Turkey this variable has a negative impact on electoral participation. This finding 
suggests that when economic conditions worsen, it creases an intention for the 
electorate to cast a vote to punish the incumbent party. However this relation does not 
explain why Turkish electorate is less likely to cast a ballot when the economic 
conditions improve.  
 
For a comparison between Turkey and Europe about the determinants of party 
preferences, it will be beneficial to recall the discussion on the impact of the social and 
political changes on the voter turnout in European democracies (given in pp. 18-20) 
indicated that in Europe party realignment is also decreasing, and new social cleavages 
take the place of party identifications. As Paul Webb claims96, these changes in the 
social structure are seen as one of the explanatory factor for the decline in voter turnout. 
In his study, Pedersen97 points out the linkage between the changes in cleavages during 
the1970s in Europe and changes in the structure of electoral volatility in Western 
European democracies. He finds out that electoral volatility increased in the 1970s 
compared to the average of electoral volatility in the 1960s (9,2 and 7,3 respectively). 
However, despite the increase in the average, he points out to the big fluctuation 
between the countries (in Germany decreases from 9,5 to 4,9; whereas in Denmark 
increases from 8,9 to 18,7), suggesting that party systems in Europe are diverging 
through the 1970s, which coincides with the hypothesis of this thesis claiming electoral 
and party system in Turkey have significant role in the high volatility in Turkish 
                                                 
96 Paul Webb, “Party Systems, Electoral Cleavages and Government”, in Developments 
in West European Politics 2, (eds.) by Paul Heywood, Erik Jones and Martin Rhodes, 
(New York : Palgrave, 2002), p. 116.  
 
97 Mogens N. Pedersen, “The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns 
of Electoral Volatility”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 7 No.1 (1979).  
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elections. For a comparison in the 1960s the average electoral volatility in Turkey is 20; 
and in the 1970s it increases to 25, pointing out the significantly high electoral volatility 
level in Turkey.  
 
Regression equation in this section only includes the test of socioeconomic 
variables only for 1977 and 1999 national and local elections, whereas the given 
electoral volatility and fragmentation in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 encompasses the all 
electoral period from 1950 for national elections and from 1963 for local elections. 
Therefore the nation-wide analysis of these variables made in the following chapters 
will provide a more relevant and rich evaluation for the influence of socioeconomic 
variables on the voter turnout and electoral volatility.  
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CHAPTER III:  METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The literature review given in Chapter I displayed that studies on individual-level, 
cross-national and nation-wide level complement each other, and in order to analyze the 
variables determine voter turnout and comprehend the pattern of electoral participation, 
all of them should be utilized. For this study, because there is not available data at 
individual-level for Turkish case, it will use only aggregated data. In sum, in addition to 
the regression model which used cross-sectional data to examine 1977 and 1999 
national and local elections at province level, here this thesis will adopt a time series 
mode of analysis using data from the period 1950 to 2002 for national elections and 
1963 to 2004 for local elections for only Turkey. Observation number (T) will be 32 in 
total composed of 14 national elections, 9 “mayor of municipality” and 9 “members of 
provincial council” electoral results.   
 
With regard to the intensive literature on voter turnout given this thesis will utilize 
works of Franklin (1999) and especially Blais (2000) as the fundamental guides. Within 
the socioeconomic environment variables that Blais suggests, this study will test only 
GNP per capita (log), growth of GNP per capita, and size of population (log)98. From 
the institutional setting the electoral system (PR vs plurality), election type (national vs 
local), compulsory voting, and within the variables of party system, number of parties 
(log) and competitiveness in the elections will be tested for Turkish national and local 
                                                 
98 Illiteracy rate and degree of democracy variables are excluded from the analysis; 
because in the analysis the illiteracy rate turns out insignificant in determining the 
electoral participation rate. However, it is included to the dataset in the Appendix C.  
The degree of democracy in Turkey ranges from 3-4 which does not change over years 
and will be unnecessary to test for a single country. 
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elections. In total eight independent variables will be utilized to explain electoral 
participation structure in Turkish elections from 1950 to 200499.   
 
.    In other words, the study will test the independent variables of cross-national 
analysis at the nation-wide level by merging Turkish national and local elections since 
1950. However, the electoral participation rate in every election will be the dependent 
variable, instead of the change in national or local elections. Turkey’s unique structure 
in terms of institutional, socioeconomic and party systems, which is explained in the 
previous chapter in detail, will be applied to the nation-wide level. Though this study 
repeats the assumptions given in the literature for Turkish case; it aims to find out 
whether there are similarities or differences between Turkey and other Western 
democracies.  Moreover, it will primarily focus on which of these variables are effective 
and important in explaining electoral participation rate. 
 
Data of all of the eight variables are available and will be used in the multiple 
regression model. For the national elections, data set composes year of 1950, 1954, 
1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2002. For the 
municipality elections (both mayor of municipality and members of provincial council) 
data set composes the year of 1963, 1968, 1973, 1977, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 
2004.  Because there are time correspondence between national and local elections in 
1973, 1977 and 1999; and mayor of municipality and members of provincial council 
elections, same data are used for same year as the quantity of the variable is accepted to 
remain same within the year. For example, population in Turkey is taken as 38073000 
for national, mayor of municipality and members of provincial council elections held in 
1973.  
 
Table 3.1: The List of Variables (National and Local Elections at Nation-wide 
Level) 
Variable Name  Explanation Source 
Electoral Participation Participation results of national 
elections and local elections 
(both mayor of municipality and 
members of provincial council) 
since 1950. Turnout indicates 
State Statistic Institute Library, Statistical 
Indicator Book (1923-2002).  
For the electoral result of 2004 local elections 
data on www.die.gov.tr is used.  
                                                 
99 The dataset is given in Appendix C. 
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the percentage of those 
registered on the electoral list 
who cast a vote.  
Size of population (log)  Logarithm of total population at 
base 10.  
State Statistic Institute Library, Statistical 
Indicator Book (1923-2002).  
For the electoral result of 2004 local elections 
data on www.die.gov.tr is used. 
GNP per capita (log) Logarithm of GNP per capita at 
base 10.  
 
GNP per capita in constant 
Turkish lira measured as GNP 
per capita in current U.S dollars 
State Statistic Institute Library, Statistical 
Indicator Book (1923-2002).  
For the electoral result of 2004 local elections 
data on www.die.gov.tr is used. 
 
Growth of GNP per Capita Annual percentage increase or 
decrease in GNP per capita in 
election years compared to 
previous year.  
State Statistic Institute Library, Statistical 
Indicator Book (1923-2002).  
For the electoral result of 2004 local elections 
data on www.die.gov.tr is used. 
Election type A dummy variable indicating 
the type of elections.  
D=1 if the election type is 
national election 
D=0 if the election type is local 
election.  
 
Electoral System A dummy variable indicating 
the electoral system.   
D=1 for PR electoral system 
D=0 for Plurality electoral 
system  
 
National elections before 1960 
will be labeled as plurality, and 
after as PR. All of the mayor of 
municipality elections are in 
plurality electoral system, 
whereas all of the members of 
provincial council elections are 
in PR electoral system.  
For national elections 
http://www.konrad.org.tr/secim/index.php 
 
For local elections 
http://www.yerelnet.org.tr/ 
 
 
Compulsory voting A dummy variable 
D=1 if it is compulsory to vote 
D=0 if it is not compulsory to 
vote 
 
Number of Parties (log) The logarithm of the number of 
parties running in the election at 
base 10. 
For national elections 
http://www.konrad.org.tr/secim/index.php 
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For local elections 
http://www.yerelnet.org.tr/ 
Competitiveness It signifies competitiveness in 
the election. Its measure is the 
gap (in vote shares) between the 
leading and the second parties.   
For national elections 
http://www.konrad.org.tr/secim/index.php 
 
For local elections 
http://www.yerelnet.org.tr/ 
 
 
As displayed in Table 3.1, three of the independent variable (GNP per capita, size 
of the population, and number of parties) are measured in logarithm at base 10. Taking 
the logarithm of these variables enables one to observe whether values of these 
variables are significant for changes in the dependent variable electoral participation 
rate. Rational choice theory clearly suggests that as the size of population increases, the 
intention to vote is expected to decrease. However, its predictions do not suggest 
whether this relationship is linear or non-linear, or after which value an increase in 
population stops influencing electoral participation, or most effective in determining it. 
For instance, for Turkey which has a high population, an increase in population may not 
create the same effect like Malta. More saliently, as mentioned in the literature review, 
the impact of the number of parties running in an election is not certainly explained by 
rational choice theory and related studies. Normally in PR electoral systems, number of 
parties is expected to be higher, which is believed to increase voter’s intention to vote 
because they are suggested more options. On the other hand, the high number of parties 
and candidates may create confusion for the voters, which increase their cost of voting. 
Taking a logarithm of the variable number of parties enables one to analyze voting 
behavior against the number of parties, whether too many or too few number of parties 
increases their intention to vote or whether there is a significant value which creates the 
highest participation rate.  
 
The thesis will adopt multiple regression model for measuring the significance of 
the variables in explaining the dependent variable. First it will make the regression with 
socioeconomic variables, then institutional setting variables (dummy variables given in 
Table 3.3) will be added to the regression, and finally party system variables will be 
included in the model.  
 
 
 72
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
National &Local participation 
rate  32 53,1 93,3 77,271 11,7265 
National participation rate 14 64,30 93,30 80,8286 9,36519 
Mayor of municipality 
participation rate 9 53,10 90,50 72,0889 13,76921 
Members of provincial council 
participation rate 9 60,40 92,20 76,9200 12,17529 
Valid N (listwise) 9         
 
 
Table 3.2 displays the dependent variables, namely electoral participation rate 
since 1950 in Turkey. The first variable is the merged data of both Turkish national and 
local elections, and which will be used as the main dependent variable to be tested. The 
other dependent variables were given in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 in detail, and related 
to identify the volatility and fragmentation in Turkish politics separately for national 
and local elections.  As the descriptive statistics suggest within the three types of 
elections, the mayor of municipality elections has the lowest participation rate, whereas 
the participation rate of members of provincial council elections is close to the ratios of 
national elections.  
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables  
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Size of population(log) 32 7,321 7,856 7,64228 ,153507 
GNP(log) 32 2,221 3,620 3,02172 ,417840 
Growth of GNP per capita 
(constant prices) 32 -7,80 7,50 1,3669 4,88971 
Number of party (log) 32 ,477 1,301 ,91722 ,240087 
Competitiveness 32 ,32 24,12 10,3272 7,49639 
Valid N (listwise) 32         
 
With regard to the literature review and approach of rational choice theory given 
previously, the relationship between 8 independent variables and dependent variable 
will be evaluated by testing the hypothesis below:  
 
1) The participation to elections is expected to increase as the size of population 
decreases.  
2) The participation to elections is expected to increase as the GNP per capita 
increases.  
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3) The participation to elections is expected to increase as the growth of GNP per 
capita increases.  
4) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the election is in a national 
election type 
5) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the election is held using a 
proportional representative electoral system.   
6) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the election constitutes 
compulsory voting.  
7) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the number of parties 
running in the elections is higher.  
8) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the election is more 
competitive.   
 
Before constructing the step-by-step fashion regression analysis and testing the 
hypothesis, a more detailed description of the properties of the variables needed to be 
given. Here, the national elections are colored as red, mayor of municipality elections as 
blue and members of provincial council as yellow for every figure in Chapter III.  
 
 
1. National and Local Elections Participation Rate  
 
 
 
As given in Table 3.2, the mean value of electoral participation rate is 77,2%, 
which is not assumed to be so high.  However the ratio increases to 80,8% for national 
elections if local elections are excluded. The minimum voter turnout of 53,1% belongs 
to the mayor of municipality elections in the year of 1977, and the highest participation 
rate of 93,3% is held on 1987 national elections.  
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of National and Local Elections Participation Rate 
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
na
t-1
95
0
na
t-1
95
4
na
t-1
95
7
na
t-1
96
1
m
ay
or
-1
96
3
m
em
be
r-1
96
3
na
t-1
96
5
m
ay
or
-1
96
8 
m
em
be
r-1
96
8
na
t-1
96
9
na
t-1
97
3
m
ay
or
-1
97
3 
m
em
be
r-1
97
3
na
t-1
97
7
m
ay
or
-1
97
7
m
em
be
r-1
97
7
na
t-1
98
3
m
ay
or
-1
98
4
m
em
be
r-1
98
4
na
t-1
98
7
m
ay
or
-1
98
9
m
em
be
r-1
98
9
na
t-1
99
1
m
ay
or
-1
99
4
m
em
be
r-1
99
4
na
t-1
99
5
na
t-1
99
9
m
ay
or
-1
99
9
m
em
be
r-1
99
9
na
t-2
00
2
m
ay
or
-2
00
4
m
em
be
r-2
00
4
Elections
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
Ra
te
 
 
Note: nat= national election (red color); mayor= mayor of municipality election (blue 
color); member= members of provincial council election (yellow color).  
 
 
In Figure 3.1, all of the elections (national, mayor of municipality and members of 
provincial council) are added with regard to their election years. Here, “nat” refers to 
national election, “mayor” refers to mayor of municipality election, and “member” 
refers to members of provincial council election. For example, nat-1957 suggests to 
national election at year 1957. The same abbreviations will be used for the all of the 
figures in this study.  
 
Within the 32 elections, 20 of them have voter turnout higher than 75%, and 15 of 
them are higher than 80%.  The histogram indicates that, the electoral participation rate 
is lower for the elections made before 1980, which suggests the effectiveness of 
compulsory voting adopted with 1982 Constitutional Law. Moreover, when we looked 
at the general distribution of the type of elections, it is prominent fact that turnout is 
higher in national election than local elections, and within the local elections, members 
of provincial council elections have a higher participation rate than mayor of 
municipality elections. In the previous chapter Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 also support 
this distribution. On the other hand, it points out that voter turnout is decreasing in 
Turkey recently which is obviously seen in 2002 national, and 2004 local elections.  
 
Another interesting point is about the influence of military coups on voter turnout. 
Figure 3.1 shows that except 1973 national elections, after every intervention to 
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democracy (1960, 1980, and 1997100) voter turnout in national elections increases 
compared to the previous national elections. This situation supports the assumption of 
Franklin that “salience of the election” is an important parameter to determine the voter 
turnout. After each intervention to the democracy, the first democratic election turns out 
to be a more important election for the citizens. Electoral results of July 2007 national 
election is not included to this study, however they will display that whether the note 
given by the military to the AKP in April 2007 (another intervention of military to 
democracy) will create a similar rise in the participation rate or not.  
 
 
2. Size of Population (log) 
 
 
The size of the population increases as the number of years increase. In the 1950 
national election year, there are 20,947,000 people whereas in 2004 the population size 
is tripled to 71,789,000. Here, the logarithm of the size of the population at base 10 
shows the increase of size of population compared to previous election.  
 
Figure 3.2: Histogram of Size of Population (log) 
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Note: nat= national election (red color); mayor= mayor of municipality election (blue 
color); member= members of provincial council election (yellow color).  
 
In contrast to the literature review claiming that the participation rate is expected 
to decrease as the size of population increases, here we see that as size of population 
                                                 
100 28 February 1997, the “civil note” given to the DYP-RP coalition.  
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increases, while participation rate is also increasing. The reason for this can be 
explained by the adoption of compulsory voting after 1980, and high amount of increase 
in population around these years. For example we see the highest jump in the logarithm 
of size of population between the electoral years 1977 and 1983 (from 7,621 to 7,680), 
and similarly the biggest difference of voter turnout within years is seen between 1977 
and 1983 as well (from 72,4% to 92,3%). As outlined in Chapter II, proportion of urban 
population of the provinces also increases after 1980, this rapid growth in population 
causes significant alternations in the pattern of voting especially in local elections.  
 
The multiple regression model which includes only socioeconomic environment 
variables (which will be displayed at the Chapter IV) suggests there is a positive 
relationship between size of population (log) and electoral participation rate, however 
the coefficient is not significant. Interestingly, as the other variables added, we observe 
a negative correlation between size of the population and the electoral participation rate, 
and the coefficient becomes significant this time. 
 
 
3. GNP per Capita in Current Prices $ (log)  
 
Similar to size of the population, GNP per capita is expected to increase with regard 
to years. In 1950 it is $166,4, and in 2004 it reaches the level of  $4172 . Here, the 
logarithm of the GNP per capita shows the increase in this variable compared to 
previous election year.  
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of GNP per Capita in Current Prices $ (log) 
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  Note: nat= national election red color); mayor= mayor of municipality election (blue 
color); member= members of provincial council election (yellow color).  
 
The histogram above displays the GNP per capita of Turkey in electoral years. It 
is better to give attention to some of these election years in order to comprehend the 
impact of military coup and political crises on Turkish economy. These are (nat-1957, 
nat-1961, mayor-1968, nat-1977, nat-1983, member 1984, nat-1999, nat-2002, and 
mayor-2004) elections. It can be said that after every military coup (1960, 1970, 1980), 
and political crises (2001) GNP per capita is significantly decreases. For instance, the 
GNP per capita at national election 1957 is higher than the GNP per capita of 1961, and 
this regression is remedied only by 1968. After 1970 military coup, it takes three years 
to recover the reduction and come to GNP per capita level of 1969. Similarly, the GNP 
per capita at the election year 1977 is higher than 1983 and 1984. Political 
fragmentation and problems in coalition government constructed after 1999 elections 
assumed to bring deep economic crisis in 2001, and we can observe the decrease in 
GNP per capita between the elections 1999 and 2002. On the other hand, the GNP per 
capita in 2004 is even higher than the 1999 level.  
 
Rational choice theory and literature on the determinants of electoral participation 
predicts that electoral participation is expected to increase as GNP per capita increases. 
However, here the histogram (and later multiple regression model) points out that in 
Turkey electoral participation increases as GNP per capita rises. People are expected to 
be involved in politics more as their welfare gets better. This difference in Turkey is 
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salient because it is the only variable that gives different result than expected within the 
variables tested.  
 
In my opinion this negative results emerges from again because of military coups, 
after which people intend to vote more in elections as a signal of taking possession of 
democracy that increases the “salience of elections” as Franklin would explain. 
Therefore as military coups cause reduction in GNP per capita, it also creates high voter 
turnout for following elections. As given in Chapter I, the study of Blais also suggests a 
negative relationship between the degree of democracy and political participation. This 
can explain low turnout ratios in countries with stable consolidated democracies. 
However, in order to understand this negative effect of GNP per capita on electoral 
participation, and the role of military coups on voter turnout, individual-level analysis 
are needed to explain people’s perception about military coups or whether they really 
intend to vote more after an intervention to democracy. Another analysis for explaining 
this assumption can be made at the cross-national level, by comparing voter turnout and 
GNP per capita ratios as the countries experienced military coups.  
 
Moreover, although Figure 3.3 indicates that the GNP per capita regresses after 
each military coup, it should be noted that there can be other factors or combination of 
other factors that cause economic crisis before military coups, such as 1973 “Oil Crisis” 
which leads to crackling of Import Substitution Industrialization in Turkey101. Similarly, 
it is known that Turkey faced high levels of devaluation because of foreign budget debt 
towards the end of 1950s after having impressive development and growth within the 
period of 1951-1953 which creates an economic crisis in 1955102.  Decrease in the voter 
turnout in 1957 national elections can be evaluated with regard to this economic crisis.  
 
 
 
                                                 
101 Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making 
Openness Work, Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1999. p. 68-103. 
102 Gülten Kazgan, Türkiye’de Ekonomik Krizler, Neden ve Sonuçları Üzerine 
Karşılaştırmalı Analiz, Economic Crisis in Turkey (1929-2001), A Comparative 
Analysis on its Causes and Effects, Degev-Türkiye İş Bankası.  
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4. Growth of GNP per Capita (Constant Prices)  
 
When the mean of growth of the GNP per capita is observed it can be said that 
1,36 ratio of growth at mean level is relatively small considering approximately 50 
years included in this analysis. The high amount of standard deviation (4,88) indicates a 
high fluctuation in economic growth suggesting an unstable economy within a 50-year 
period. In the dataset, the lowest economic growth is recorded in 1994 with -7,8 value, 
and the highest economic growth is achieved in 1987 with +7,5 ratio. 
 
Figure 3.4: Histogram of Growth of GNP per Capita (Constant Prices) 
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  Note: nat= national election (red color); mayor= mayor of municipality election (blue 
color); member= members of provincial council election (yellow color).  
 
In general the distribution of the cases displays a positive growth inclination. It is 
seen that Turkey experiences the worst economical performance during the 1990s in 
which fragmentation was high and political stability was fragile due to rapidly changing 
coalition governments.  
 
Similar to the variable of GNP per capita (log), but in contrast to predictions of the 
literature review, in the case of Turkey, growth in GNP per capita negatively affects 
participation rate in elections.  
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        Table 3.4: Correlations between Dependent Variable and Socioeconomic   
Variables 
 
  
National &local 
participation rate 
log(popul
ation) log(GNP) 
Growth of GNP 
per capita 
(constant prices) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
National &local 
participation rate 1,000 ,289 ,206 -,285
  log(population) ,289 1,000 ,964 -,260
 log(GNP) ,206 ,964 1,000 -,252
 Growth of GNP per 
capita (constant 
prices) 
-,285 -,260 -,252 1,000
 
 
Table 3.4 shows the correlations between variables explained till now. High 
correlation rate (0,954) between size of population variable and GNP per capita variable 
indicates an omitted variable bias between the independent variables. For these two 
variables it is an expected situation, because GNP per capita is calculated by dividing 
GNP to size of the population, in other words GNP per capita is written in terms of size 
of the population. On the other hand, they are negatively correlated with the variable 
growth of GNP per capita. Despite the high correlation, all three of these independent 
variables will be included to the regression model. Detail analysis of regression model, 
and relationship between the variables will be examined in Chapter IV.  
 
 
5. Election type  
 
Election type is one of the institutional setting variables refers to whether the 
election is national or local election; therefore it is constructed as a binary variable. In 
Table 3.3, it is given as the minimum value for election type is 0, and maximum is 1; 
however these numbers does not signify a scale value. Mean value and standard 
deviation cannot be interpreted for dummy variables as well, it only suggests that 
number of local elections included in the dataset is higher than number of national 
elections.  
 
Within this study, the election type is one of the salient variables selected to be 
tested for analyzing voter turnout in Turkey. That is why electoral results of national 
and local elections are merged within the same dataset in this study. There are 14 
 81
national elections and 18 (9 mayor of municipality elections and 9 members of 
provincial council) elections included in the data set, which increase the total number of 
observations to 32.  
 
According to the literature review, a positive relationship is expected between 
election type and electoral participation rate.  In other words if the election is at national 
level people are inclined to vote more than at a local election due to the fact that it is 
perceived as a more salient election. Because it is a dummy variable a histogram fails to 
indicate a relationship between election type and electoral participation rate, however 
the regression model supports the hypothesis that electoral participation is expected to 
increase if the election is a national election.  
 
 
6. Electoral System 
 
The electoral system is another binary variable within the dataset, which has a 
value of 1 for proportional electoral systems (PR) and 0 for plurality electoral systems. 
The mean value indicates that most of the elections included in the dataset are held in 
PR electoral system.  
 
Within the dataset, 12 elections are held using a plurality system, and 20 elections 
are made using a PR electoral system. The first three national elections namely (1950, 
1954 and 1957) use a plurality system with large constituencies, whereas after the 
military coup at 1960 the new Constitutional Law determines the elections to use a PR 
electoral system. The 12 elections using plurality systems are 3 national elections + 9 
mayor of municipality elections.  
 
It should be noted that after 1960 the electoral system of the national elections 
have changed several times. The detailed categories of these systems used are: d’Hont 
with threshold (in 1961); d’Hont without threshold (in 1965, 1969, and 1973); d’Hont 
with double threshold (in 1983); quota d’Hont with double threshold (in 1987 and 
1991); and d’Hont with national threshold (in 1995, 1999, and 2002).  However, all 
these electoral variations are sub-types of the PR electoral system and in this thesis they 
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will be computed as PR electoral systems103. In addition to these 11 national elections, 
all 9 of the members of provincial council elections used PR electoral system.  
 
Rational choice theory point out that participation rate is expected to increase if 
the election is at the national level and if PR is used. If it is considered that 11 of the PR 
electoral system data in the model are also national elections, we can mention the 
correlation between election type and electoral system for this study. However, with the 
correlations data it is seen that the correlation between these variables are 0,293 (Table 
3.5), which does not suggest an omitted variable bias situation. Here, including 
members of provincial council elections not only raises the number of observations to 
have more reliable results, but also prevents a high correlation ratio.  
 
 
7. Compulsory Voting 
 
Compulsory voting is the third and last institutional setting variable within the 
dataset, and it is a binary variable as well. For the elections in which voting was 
enforced, the value of the variable is 1, and in the election that does not apply 
compulsory voting, the value is 0. As a mean value indicates within the 32 total 
elections, the number of elections that constitutes compulsory voting is equal to the 
ones that do not have any compulsory enforcement of voting,  
 
As has been mentioned previously, the law for making the participation to 
elections compulsory was enacted in the 1982 Constitutional Law. This salient situation 
of Turkey, enables this thesis study to test the hypothesis that electoral participation is 
expected to increase if there is a mandatory for voting. 
 
Blais (2000) asserts that several types of analysis and existing studies do not 
provide us with a solid explanation. Nevertheless, there is only one consistent result, 
which is the positive effect of compulsory voting on electoral participation rate. For 
                                                 
103  Although the high national threshold of 10% changes the application of PR electoral 
system for the benefit of major parties and supports to exclude small parties to enter into 
the National Assembly (as outlined in Chapter II), again all the national elections after 
1961 are labeled as PR electoral systems.  
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Turkey, we justify the same positive influence of compulsory voting on voter turnout. 
The 1983 national election is registered as the election, which had the highest voter 
turnout compared to the previous elections. The same impact is seen on local elections 
as well. On the other hand, the recent regression in the voter turnout (79,1% 
participation rate in the 2002 national elections and the 75,3% voter turnout for the 
elections of members of provincial council) signifies that compulsory voting is not 
sufficient enough to compel people to vote in elections.  
 
Here, another interesting point should be noted about the application of the 
compulsory voting. Although since 1982 Constitutional law, Turkey applied 
compulsory voting and for the first elections a monetary punishment was used for the 
ones did not vote without a valid excuse, in recent years practically no one is fined for 
not voting. The reason is cost of sending the notification to the person who did not vote 
in the election exceeds the charge of not voting.  
 
   Table 3.5: Correlations between Dependent Variable and Institutional Variables 
 
 
Table 3.5 shows the correlation between dependent variable and institutional 
setting variables, and it indicates that between the dependent variable and compulsory 
voting there is relatively high correlation, in other words compulsory voting is one of 
the most determinant variables that influence voter turnout in Turkey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National &local 
participation rate election type 
electoral 
system 
compulsory 
voting 
Pearson 
Correlation 
National &local 
participation rate 1,000 ,272 ,134 ,663
  election type ,272 1,000 ,293 -,126
  electoral system ,134 ,293 1,000 ,129
  compulsory 
voting ,663 -,126 ,129 1,000
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8. Number of Parties (log)  
 
The number of parties running for each election is included in the dataset as 
number of parties, and the logarithm of the variable is taken in order to measure effect 
of its value on electoral participation. The mean of the distribution signifies that in most 
of the elections, the number of parties is less than but close to 10 due to the fact that the 
logarithm is at base 10.  
 
Figure 3.5: Histogram of Number of Parties (log)  
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  Note: nat= national election (red color); mayor= mayor of municipality election (blue 
color); member= members of provincial council election (yellow color).  
 
Here the histogram shows the distribution of the number of parties and the 
elections to identify its role on electoral participation. As it is seen the number of parties 
running in mayor of municipality and members of provincial council are equal for every 
election.  
 
From this histogram, the influence of military coups and alternations to the 
electoral system on the number of parties can be observed clearly.  After the 1960 
military coup and 1961 Constitutional Law that changed the electoral system from 
plurality to the PR electoral system, the number of parties running in elections increases 
significantly. Before the military coup of 1980, in the 1977 elections the number of 
parties approaches 10 in the mayor of municipality elections, indicating the emergence 
of fragmentation in the political party system.  
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   The 1980 military coup first creates an opposite effect by closing the established 
parties and banning previous politicians from politics. In the 1983 national elections, 
number of parties reduces from 8 (1977 national elections) to 3. Within one year, this 
number increased to 6 in 1984 for the mayor of municipality elections, and to 7 in 1987 
for the national elections. Most strikingly, for the last two national and local elections, 
the number of parties running in the elections are around 18-20 level, which signifies 
the high level of fragmentation and also explains the volatility of votes. Moreover, as 
has been mentioned before although compulsory voting is still being applied, voter 
turnout begins to decrease for these elections, which indicates a negative role of the 
high number of parties running in elections regarding the intention of people to vote. 
 
 
9. Competitiveness (Closeness) 
 
The variable competitiveness signifies how closer the election is, and it is 
measured by calculating the gap (in vote shares) between the leading and the second 
parties. If the vote shares are closer (smaller) between the two parties, this suggests a 
competitive election, and voter turnout is expected to be higher. Therefore, the 
coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative. The mean value of 7,5 indicates 
that there is a competitive structure of parties in Turkish politics.  
 
Figure 3.6: Histogram of Competitiveness  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
na
t-1
95
0
na
t-1
95
4
na
t-1
95
7
na
t-1
96
1
m
ay
or
-1
96
3
m
em
be
r-1
96
3
na
t-1
96
5
m
ay
or
-1
96
8 
m
em
be
r-1
96
8
na
t-1
96
9
na
t-1
97
3
m
ay
or
-1
97
3 
m
em
be
r-1
97
3
na
t-1
97
7
m
ay
or
-1
97
7
m
em
be
r-1
97
7
na
t-1
98
3
m
ay
or
-1
98
4
m
em
be
r-1
98
4
na
t-1
98
7
m
ay
or
-1
98
9
m
em
be
r-1
98
9
na
t-1
99
1
m
ay
or
-1
99
4
m
em
be
r-1
99
4
na
t-1
99
5
na
t-1
99
9
m
ay
or
-1
99
9
m
em
be
r-1
99
9
na
t-2
00
2
m
ay
or
-2
00
4
m
em
be
r-2
00
4
Elections
Co
m
pe
tit
iv
en
es
s
 
  Note: nat= national election (red color); mayor= mayor of municipality election (blue 
color); member= members of provincial council election (yellow color).  
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Member of provincial council elections in 1994, and mayor of municipality 
elections in 1999 are the most competitive elections, which have vote differences of 0, 
32 and 0, 97 respectively. In general, 13 of the 32 elections are highly competitive and 
have vote gap less than 5%. The elections that are less competitive are the national 1954 
election, the national 1965 election and the 2004 member of provincial council 
elections.  
 
The histogram and distribution of the elections displays the importance of social 
and political events on competitiveness of the elections. After the 1960 military coup, 
the competitiveness between CHP and DP increased and this polarization of leftist and 
rightist ideology reflected in the results of the election of 1961. The most polarized 
years of Turkish politics occurred during the 1970s, and social movements also created 
competitiveness between leftist and rightist parties. After 1980, there was a decrease in 
polarization and competitiveness in the elections, whereas the years between 1994-1999 
again witnessed polarization between secular and pro-Islamist parties.  Moreover, this 
new cleavage in Turkish society increased competitiveness between running parties. In 
addition to its relation with number of parties, the reduction of voter turnout for the 
recent elections can also be the result of a decrease in competitiveness.  
 
Moreover, from this histogram high correlation between national and local 
elections in terms of competitiveness can be observed as well. If previous national 
election is highly competitive, the following local election also witnesses a closer race 
between the first two parties.  
 
In addition to this, the last two histograms show that although the number of 
parties in the elections is high in Turkish election system, this does not decrease 
competitiveness between the major parties. They still have a closer race and most of the 
votes are shared between them. At that point it will be beneficial to control for the 
correlation between these two party system variables, the number of parties (log) and 
competitiveness. Moreover it is seen that after 1980s local elections especially mayor of 
municipality elections become highly competitive.  
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Table 3.6: Correlations between the Dependent Variable and Party System 
Variables 
 
 
Table 3.6 indicates that even though these two variables complement each other in 
explaining the effect of party system on electoral participation, there is a low correlation 
between the number of parties (log) and the competitiveness in the elections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National &local 
participation 
rate 
Number of 
party(log) 
 
Competitivenes
s 
Pearson Correlation National &local 
participation rate 1,000 -,082 -,149
  Number of party(log) -,082 1,000 -,178
  Competitiveness 
-,149 -,178 1,000
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CHAPTER IV: REGRESSION MODEL and FINDINGS 
 
 
In this chapter the scatter-plots of the dependent variable and independent 
variables will be given in order to point out the mutual relationship between them, and 
observe the data that do not fit the linear pattern. Then, step by step multiple regression 
models will be included to analyze the impact of independent variables on voter turnout.  
 
In every figure indicated above abbreviations for election types and years are 
used. For example nat-1950 refers to the national election of 1950; may-1963 refers to 
the mayor of municipality election of 1963; and mem-1963 refers to the member of 
provincial council elections of 1963. 
 
 
a. Electoral Participation Rate and Size of Population (log) 
 
As Figure 3.2 also showed, there is a positive relationship between the size of 
population and the electoral participation rate which contradicts with the expectations of 
rational choice theory which assumes that with a larger population voter turnout is 
expected to be low due to the fact that the decisiveness of a vote will approach to nil.  
 
Interestingly, even in a one to one relationship, the size of population affects voter 
turnout positively, and also in Table 4.1 below, the regression design (including only 
socioeconomic variables) supports this positive impact. The further regressions 
including institutional and party system variables given in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 
respectively, points out a negative relationship between the size of population and voter 
turnout which supports the assumption of rational choice theory.  
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Figure 4.1: Electoral Participation Rate and Size of Population (log) 
 
 
 
Here the one to one scatter plot signifies a positive relationship between size of 
population and the dependent variable. The slope of the linear line determines a strong 
influence of size of the population on voter turnout; even most of the elections on the 
dataset do not fit to the linear line.  
 
Voter turnout is seen to be at its lowest level around the mean of size of 
population (7,64228), and it increases for the value below and above of it.  
 
As has been mentioned before, this positive correlation can be the result of the 
high increase in population after 1980s in Turkey, and the high levels of voter turnout 
again after 1980 because of application of compulsory voting. The significant outliners 
are the national elections in 1950 and 1954, in which an increase in the size of the 
population was slow, but electoral participation is relatively high. The other determinant 
outlines national elections in 1999 and 2002 and local elections in 1999 and 2004 (last 
two national and local elections) and points out an opposite situation in which as size of 
population increases, voter turnout decreases. On the other hand, the national and local 
elections held in between 1968 to 1995 are the ones best fit the linear line.  
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b. Electoral Participation Rate and GNP per Capita (log) 
 
In Chapter III, the high correlation between size of population (log) and GNP per 
capita (log) was mentioned. Here we see again, similar to the size of population, GNP 
per capita also has a positive influence on electoral participation rate. On the other hand, 
the slope of the linear line has a flat structure compared to the slope of the size of the 
population 
 
Figure 4.2: Electoral Participation Rate and GNP per Capita (log) 
 
 
Similar to the scatter plot of size of population, same elections (namely national 
elections at 1950, 1954, 1999 and 2002 and local elections at 1999 and 2004) are being 
observed as outliners here. For the elections at 1950 and 1954, voter turnout is 
significantly high even GNP per capita is relatively lower, and for the local elections at 
2004 it is the opposite case. Again the elections between 1968 and 1994 fit best to the 
linear line. The elections that are held after a military coup are marked with red square 
point out that (except 1973 elections) after each military coup GNP per capita decreases 
whereas electoral participation rate increases.  
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Electoral participation rate of the elections is seen to be at its lowest level for the 
value of GNP per capita around 3, which is the mean of the variable, suggesting a 
quadratic line model.  
 
In contrast to the plot above, in all of the three regression models the sign of the 
coefficient of GNP per capita (log) is negative, which is the opposite result of what 
rational choice theory suggests.  
 
 
c. Electoral Participation Rate and Growth of GNP per Capita 
 
The scatter plot below indicates a negative relationship between electoral 
participation rate and growth of GNP per capita. This opposite effect of GNP per capita 
and growth of GNP per capita seen on the plots signifies that it is not only the level of 
economic development that matters but also the economic conjuncture at the time of the 
election. Blais argues that “economic adversity depresses turnout, because it disrupts the 
kind of social relationships that nurture political participation and induces people to 
withdraw form politics and focus on their personal concerns”104. 
 
Figure 4.3: Electoral Participation Rate and Growth of GNP per Capita 
 
                                                 
104 Blais, To Vote or Not to Vote, p.24 
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The slope of the linear line indicates that the growth of GNP per capita influences 
electoral participation rate in national and local elections more than GNP per capita 
(log). National elections 1950, 1954 and 1999 are again within the group of outliners. 
The elections that are marked with red square are the ones happen after an economic 
crisis (1955, 1977, and 2001).  Considering the volatility and fragmentation index of 
national election given in the Figure 2.2, it can be said that after every economic crisis, 
volatility in votes increases. Turkish electorates punish the economically unsuccessful 
government by their votes, in other words they use “protest voting” as a pattern of voter 
behavior. In 1957 elections DP lost its vote share to CHP; in 1973 elections AP’s votes 
went to CHP; and in 2002 a new established party AKP collected the votes of the 
existing parties which were the responsibilities of the economic crisis of 2001 (ANAP 
and MHP)105.  
 
 
d. Electoral Participation Rate and Institutional Setting Variables 
(Election type, Electoral System and Compulsory Voting)  
 
Rational choice theory assumes that in national elections the voter turnout is 
expected to be higher than in local elections, and the election type is one of the common 
results of the studies on electoral participation. In terms of electoral system, if PR 
electoral system is used voter turnout is expected to be higher compared to plurality 
electoral system. In elections using compulsory voting electoral participation is 
expected to increase as well.  
  
Here, because these variables are dummy variables taking the value 1 and 0 only 
in the elections, the distribution of the dataset does not exactly fit with the linear line; 
therefore there will not be plot given in the thesis for the relationship between electoral 
participation rate and election type. The same situation is valid for the other institutional 
setting variables; electoral system and compulsory voting.  
 
                                                 
105 Appendix B.  
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On the other hand, it should be noted that the plots of these variables (and the 
slopes) indicate in terms of determining the voter turnout they all have positive impact, 
but compulsory voting is the most effective one, election type follows this, and electoral 
system has a positive but more lightly influence.  
 
Up to now, the plots point out that institutional setting variables are more 
important and deterministic than socioeconomic environment variables in affecting 
electoral participation rate in Turkish national and local elections.  
 
 
e. Electoral Participation Rate and Number of Parties (log) 
 
Within the independent variables to be tested, influence of number of parties is the 
most unclear one. Number of parties running in the elections depends mostly on the 
electoral and party system of the countries. For the countries using the PR electoral 
system, number of parties expected to be higher because they will have multiparty 
regimes. From this point of view, high number of parties running in the elections 
suggests an increase in voter turnout from rational choice theory approach as well. On 
the other hand, if there are intensive amount of parties in the elections (or independent 
candidates) this will increase the cost of voting for the electorates because voting will 
become more complicated and time consuming.  
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Figure 4.4: Electoral Participation Rate and Number of Parties (log) 
 
 
Figure 4.4 displays there is a negative relationship between number of parties and 
electoral participation rate in Turkish national and local elections. Slope of the linear 
line is nearly flat which suggests the influence of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable is not that much significant.  
 
The voter turnout is at the lowest level for the elections in which number of parties 
(log) is around 1 suggesting the number is around 10 parties. Electoral participation is at 
its highest level when number of parties running in the election is 3-4 or 11-12. It 
decreases if the number of parties is between 4-10 and 13-20.  This situation in Turkish 
case coincides with the assumptions of rational choice theory, in which the value of 
number of parties running in the elections matters for the electorates in order to make 
cost and benefit analysis of voting. However, in the regression model in Table 4.3 
below, in contrast to the plot at Figure 4.4, the coefficient sign of this variable is 
positive.  
 
Here, again national elections at 1950, 1954, 1999 and local election at 2004 are 
determined as outliners, and they are at the opposite sides of the linear line. Most 
interestingly it is seen that both of the national elections at 1961 and 1983 (nat-1961, 
100,090,080,070,060,050,0
NATIONAL & LOCAL PARTICIPATION RATE
1,400
1,200
1,000
0,800
0,600
0,400
N
U
M
BE
R
 o
f P
A
R
TI
ES
 (l
og
)
mem-2004
may-2004
nat-2002
mem-1999may-1999
nat-1999
nat-1995
mem-1994
may-1994
nat-1991
mem-1989may-1989 nat-1987
mem-1984
nat-1983
mem-1977may-1977
nat-1977mem-1973
may-1973 nat-1973
may-1968
nat-1965 mem-1963
may-1963
nat-1961
nat-1957 nat-1954
nat-1950
R Sq Linear = 0,007
Outliners 
Nat= national election 
Mayor= mayor of 
municipality election 
Mem= members of 
provincial council 
election
 95
nat-1983) have high level of voter turnout whereas there are low number of parties 
running in these elections. This situation can be explained by analyzing the impact of 
military coups on Turkish politics. 
 
 These elections are salient because they are the first democratic elections done 
after the military coups. Especially after 1980 military coup, main and stable parties are 
closed and politicians are banned from politics, which decreased the number of parties 
(established parties) and most importantly damaged political socialization process for 
Turkish politics. On the other hand, because compulsory voting is started to being 
applied in both Turkish national and local elections, after 1980 (first two decade) 
electoral participation rate in elections upraises significantly.  
 
f. Electoral Participation Rate and Competitiveness  
 
The second determinant of the party system variables is the competitiveness, 
which measures the gap between the vote shares of the leading and second parties. 
Therefore there a negative relationship between competitiveness and voter turnout is 
expected as the gap between the two parties decreases if the election is more 
competitive.  
 
Figure 4.5: Electoral Participation Rate and Competitiveness  
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Figure 4.5 given above justifies the expectation of rational choice theory by 
pointing out a downward linear line. On the other hand, most of the elections included 
in the dataset do not fit this linear line. The R-square of the linear is 0,022 which 
indicate that the variable competitiveness is not good at explaining the changes in voter 
turnout.  
 
Elections done on 1970s and 1990s are observed as the more competitive ones, 
which suggests that the high level of polarization between left and right parties in 1970s 
and between secularist and pro-Islamist parties in 1990s reflected to the voter shares. 
However, this competitiveness does not seem to increase voter turnout in 1970s but 
relatively increases for the elections in 1990s. Voter turnout for the Turkish elections is 
at its lowest level for the national and local elections done at 1973 and 1977.  
 
Other interesting point is, except 1994 and 1999 local elections, local elections 
seem to be more competitive than the national elections. Moreover, as has been 
mentioned for the histogram of Figure 3.6, if the previous national election competitive, 
the following local elections is competitive as well.  
 
 With regard to competitiveness, again military coup of 1980 affects Turkish 
politics. The Figure 4.5 displays that competitiveness decreases significantly for the 
elections done in 1980s locating right up side of the linear line.  
 
 
g. Step by Step Multiple Regression Model 
 
Before showing the regression models, it will be beneficial to recall the hypothesis 
aimed to be tested for this thesis and give the regression equation.  
 
EPR= βConstant+ βPopulationx XPopulation + βGNP x XGNP + βGrowth x XGrowth + βET x 
DET+ βES x DES+ βc x Dc+ βN.Parties x XN.Parties + βCompetitiveness x XCompetitiveness     
                                                                                                                          (4.1) 
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Hypothesis:  
 
1) The participation to elections is expected to increase as the size of the population 
decreases.  
2) The participation to elections is expected to increase as the GNP per capita 
increases.  
3) The participation to elections is expected to increase as the growth of GNP per 
capita increases.  
4) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the election is at the  
national level 
5) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the election is held using 
a proportional representative electoral system.   
6) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the election constitutes 
compulsory voting.  
7) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the number of parties 
running in the elections is higher.  
8) The participation to elections is expected to increase if the election is more 
competitive.   
 
The regression models will be structured in this order. First the effect of 
socioeconomic environment variables on electoral participation rate will be tested. Then 
institutional setting variables will be included to the regression model. Last regression 
party system variables will be added to the model and the regression will display the 
impact of all of the variables mentioned in the thesis, and test whether they are 
significant in affecting voter turnout in Turkish national and local elections in the way 
rational choice theory expects.  
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Table 4.1: Regression Model with Socioeconomic Environment Variables  
Coefficientsa
-548,347 319,850 -1,714 ,098
93,387 48,573 1,222 1,923 ,065
-28,899 17,808 -1,030 -1,623 ,116
-,546 ,418 -,228 -1,305 ,203
(Constant)
SIZE OF
POPULATION (log)
GNP (log)
GROWTH of GNP
PER CAPITA
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: NATIONAL & LOCAL PARTICIPATION RATEa. 
 
 
  
R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate F 
,206 0,120 10,9973 2,416 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 indicated that size of population and GNP per capita 
variables positively affects electoral participation, whereas increase in growth of GNP 
per capita cause a reduction in voter turnout. These signs of size of population (log) and 
growth of GNP per capita were the opposite of what rational choice theory and the 
hypothesis suggests.  
 
On the multi-variable linear regression model above, it is seen that in contrast to 
Figure 4.2, GNP per capita (log) has a coefficient with a negative sign. If GNP per 
capita changes (increases) for %1 this creates a reduction in electoral participation rate 
approximately 0, 29. If size of population increases for %1, voter turnout will increase 
approximately 1% (0, 93). Holding the other variables constant, if growth of GNP per 
capita changes 1 unit, this will cause a decrease in voter turnout of a value of 0,546. 
 
When t-statistic value of these three variables is examined, we can say that they 
are not significant at 5% level. Constant parameter is also not significant in effecting 
voter turnout. F-statistic of these variables (2,416) supports that these variables are not 
significant at 5% level in a joint hypothesis. Moreover, R-square of 0,206 indicates that 
socioeconomic variables can only explain 20% of the data in the regression model. 
Standard error of the estimate is also relatively high (10, 9973).  
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Table 4.2: Regression Equation with Socioeconomic Environment and Institutional 
Setting Variables 
Coefficientsa
679,747 194,649 3,492 ,002
-80,008 28,503 -1,047 -2,807 ,010
-4,247 8,043 -,151 -,528 ,602
-,573 ,172 -,239 -3,342 ,003
3,421 1,930 ,147 1,772 ,089
3,442 1,979 ,144 1,739 ,094
37,870 3,627 1,641 10,442 ,000
(Constant)
SIZE OF POPULATION
(log)
GNP (log)
GROWTH of GNP PER
CAPITA
ELECTORAL TYPE
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
COMPULSORY VOTING
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: NATIONAL & LOCAL PARTICIPATION RATEa. 
  
 
R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate F 
,882 ,853 4,4940 31,012 
 
 
When institutional setting variables (election type, election system, and 
compulsory voting) are also included to the regression model, significant increase in R-
square is noticeable (from 0,206 to 0,882). It is known that as more variables are added 
to the regression, R-square is expected to increase. However, even three more variables 
will be added to the regression model at Table 4.3, R-square does not increases so 
much. This indicates that institutional setting variables are the most salient determinants 
in explaining voter turnout for Turkish national and local elections. Moreover, growth 
in adjusted R-square indicates that the data fits better. Standard error of the estimate 
decreases, and F-statistic become significant at 5% and 1% confidence level.  
 
If the variables and regression model in Table 4.2 are analyzed by one by, we can 
say that coefficient sign of size of population and intercept coefficient is changed with 
regard to the expectations. Now if size of population increases, this cause a reduction in 
voter turnout, and this variable is significant at 5% and 1% confidence level. GNP per 
capita and growth of GNP per capita still has negative coefficient signs. GNP per capita 
(log) is not significant, however growth of GNP per capita is significant at 5% and 1% 
confidence level.  
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For the three institutional setting variables, it is noticed that as aforementioned, 
they have a positive impact on electoral participation rate. If the election type is national 
election, if the election uses the PR electoral system and if compulsory voting is applied 
at the election; people are expected to intend to vote more. However, within them only 
compulsory voting is significant at 5% and 1% level of confidence, whereas election 
type and electoral system are significant at %10 confidence level.  
 
Within these variables, size of population and compulsory voting are the ones that 
determine the voter turnout the most.  
 
Table 4.3: The Last Regression Equation with Socioeconomic Environment, 
Institutional Setting and Party System Variables 
 
 
 
 
R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate F 
,908 ,877 4,1204 28, 511 
 
 
 
When party system variables are also included to the regression model, both R-
square and adjusted R-square increases, meaning the independent variables are good at 
predicting the dependent variable. F-statistic indicates the restrictions are significant at 
Coefficientsa
1053,436 244,981 4,300 ,000
-132,557 35,372 -1,735 -3,748 ,001
-,715 7,647 -,025 -,094 ,926
-,379 ,179 -,158 -2,120 ,045
3,322 1,770 ,143 1,877 ,073
4,292 1,895 ,180 2,264 ,033
45,765 4,756 1,983 9,623 ,000
15,935 7,233 ,326 2,203 ,038
-,202 ,115 -,129 -1,748 ,094
(Constant)
SIZE OF POPULATION
(log)
GNP (log)
GROWTH of GNP PER 
CAPITA
ELECTION TYPE 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
COMPULSORY VOTING
NUMBER of PARTIES
(log)
COMPETITIVENESS
Model
1 
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: NATIONAL & LOCAL PARTICIPATION RATEa. 
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5% and 1% level of confidence. Sign of the constant variable is positive as expected, 
and it is significant at 5% and 1 % level.  
 
Here are the summary of the results obtained: 
  
1. Size of population (log) is also significant in determining voter turnout at 1% 
confidence level. As the size of population increases by 1%, electoral 
participation is expected to decrease 1,32 point. Therefore we reject the 
hypothesis saying size of population is not significant to affect the dependent 
variable, and this result coincides with the assumption of literature review and 
rational choice theory.  
 
2. In contrast to the expectations of rational choice theory, for Turkish case GNP 
per capita (log) negatively influences voter turnout. However its t-statistic shows 
that this variable is not significant in affecting electoral participation rate.  
 
It should be noted that in the regression model made in province level for 1977 
and 1999 elections (Chapter II), it was observed that again GDP per capita (log) 
negatively affects voter turnout. Therefore, thesis manages to show that the tests 
made with cross-sectional data and time-series data coincides with each other.  
 
3. Again in contrast to the assumptions of rational choice theory, here it is seen that 
growth of GNP per capita negatively affects electoral participation in Turkey. If 
it increases 1 unit, voter turnout is expected to decrease 0, 379 unit. This 
variable is significant at 5 % confidence level, however not significant at 1% 
level.  
 
Here, we reject the null hypothesis that this variable is not significant in 
determining electoral participation rate; however the sign of the variable 
coefficient is the opposite than the expectations.  
 
4. Complying with the expectations of rational choice theory, election type as a 
positive coefficient, which means that voter turnout will increase 3,32 point if 
the elections are at national level. This variable is significant at %10 confidence 
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level, however not significant at 5% and 1% level. So, we can reject the null 
hypothesis at 10% significance level.  
 
5. The positive variable coefficient of electoral system points out that if the 
elections are using the PR electoral system rather than the plurality, then this 
increases people’s intention to vote for 4,29 point. This variable is significant in 
affecting voter turnout at 10% and 5% level, and it complies with the 
expectations of rational choice theory.  
 
6. It can be said that within the institutional variables, compulsory voting is the 
most determining regressor. If the election applies compulsory voting, this 
creates a 45,7% of growth in voter turnout. It is significant even at 1% 
confidence level; hence we reject the hypothesis claiming compulsory voting is 
not influential on electoral participation rate.  
 
As outlined in the literature review, Lijphart asserts that making the voting 
compulsory could be a solution to the decline in voter turnout for USA and can 
maximize the voter turnout by minimizing the free-rider problem. Here, it can be 
claimed that Turkish case supports the assumption of Lijphart, because with the 
adoption of compulsory voting in 1982, voter turnout increases significantly 
comparing the levels in 1977 and 1983.  
 
Whereas, as discussed before in recent elections a fine cannot be charged to the 
ones that failed to vote in election, because the cost of sending a notification 
exceeds the payment of fine. This loop in the practically application of 
compulsory voting can be the reason for decline in voter turnout in recent 
elections.  
 
7. Number of parties (log) has a positive coefficient parameter, indicating that if 
number of parties increases 1 unit, voter turnout is expected to increase 0, 15 
unit. This result also supports the expectation of rational choice theory, and 
proves the assumption of Duverger (mentioned on Chapter I) that there is a high 
relationship between party systems and electoral systems.  
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This variable is significant at 10% and 5% level; hence we can conclude that this 
variable is significant in determining voter turnout in Turkish national and local 
elections.  
 
8. Competitiveness has a negative coefficient as expected. If the vote shares 
between the leading and second party increases for 1%, this creates a reduction 
in voter turnout for 0,2 unit. On the other hand, this variable is not significant at 
1% and 5% level; hence we can reject the hypothesis only at 10% confidence 
level.  
 
Interestingly, competitiveness can be measured after the elections are done, 
which indicates it is hard to guess its impact on people’s voting behavior. People 
are expected to predict competitiveness of the elections before they cast a vote. 
If they consider there will be a closer race between the two parties, this will 
increase their intention to vote, if not it will withdraw them from voting. 
However, at this point, if it is assumed that the election will not be competitive, 
and this will reduce the voter turnout, decisiveness of one vote will be increased 
for the ones casting a vote from the view of rational choice theory.  
 
Moreover, as has been aforementioned, when a national election is competitive, 
the following local election becomes more competitive as well. This means, 
competitiveness influences the voter behavior of individuals before and also 
after the elections.  
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis mainly tested whether the socioeconomic, institutional and party 
system variables discussed in the work of Blais (2000) and Franklin (1999) have a 
similar influence on the electoral participation in Turkish national and local elections. 
The thesis aims to understand the factors that motivate Turkish electorates to vote in the 
elections. Here, for the first time, voter turnout in the local elections is also taken as a 
dependent variable, and voter turnout in Turkish national and local elections are merged 
in the same dataset, which makes it possible to test and analyze the effect of election 
type (national v. local) and electoral system (proportional representation and plurality) 
on the political participation of the Turkish electorates. Within the thesis mainly two 
different tests take place. First the socioeconomic (urbanization ratio, GDP per capita, 
and regional differences) and the institutional variables (election type, electoral system 
and compulsory voting) are tested on province-level (in Chapter II) for 1977 and 1999 
national and local elections by using cross-sectional data and utilizing a multiple 
regression model. Then the socioeconomic (size of population, GNP per capita, growth 
in GNP per capita), institutional (election type, electoral system, compulsory voting) 
and party system (number of parties, competitiveness) variables are tested on nation-
wide level (in Chapter IV) by using time-series data including all of  the national (1950-
2002) and local elections (1963-2004) and utilizing another multiple regression model.  
 
The hypotheses are based on the assumptions of the rational choice theory, which 
suggests that people act with regard to maximize their benefits and provide an action if 
its benefits exceeds the cost of doing it. Both multiple regression models in province 
and nation-wide level indicate that within the various variables, institutional setting 
variables (especially adoption of compulsory voting) are the most effective in 
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determining voter turnout in elections. This finding supports the assumption of the 
rational choice institutionalism which asserts that institutions shape the behavior of 
individual members and can cause individuals within institutions to maximize benefits.  
 
The results of the tests mostly coincide with the expectations of rational choice 
theory and studies of previous works on voter turnout; however it signifies the different 
characteristic of Turkey for the socioeconomic variables as well. While both 
institutional setting and party system variables display the similar influence in Turkish 
voter behavior with the other countries, socioeconomic variables contradict with the 
expectations of rational choice theory.  
 
 In the one to one analysis of the dependent and independent variables (Chapter 
IV), the size of population positively influences voter turnout, which falsifies the 
assumption of rational choice theory. It is explained by referring to the rapid increase in 
the size of population after 1980s which corresponds with the adoption of compulsory 
voting with 1982 Constitutional Law caused a significant jump in the electoral 
participation.  
 
The other socioeconomic variables that contradict the prediction of rational choice 
theory and the studies in literature are GNP per capita (log) and growth in GNP per 
capita. Although it is expected that voter turnout increases as the economical condition 
of the countries gets better, both analyses display that in Turkey the improvement of 
economical conditions negatively affects the electoral participation in general however 
has a positive impact on voter turnout only if the province is located in Marmara and 
Aegean region which has high number of population (mostly urban population). In this 
thesis this contradictory result for Turkey is explained due to the military coups which 
have caused a regression in the GNP per capita, but an increase in the voter turnout in 
the following first democratic elections.  
 
Province-level analysis indicate that proportion of the urban population in the 
province is a significant variable in determining the voter turnout, but as Ozbudun and 
Tachau assert Turkey is one of the countries in which electoral participation decreases 
as the urbanization, modernization and industrialization levels of the province increases. 
On the other hand, a comparison of 1977 and 1999 national and local elections indicated 
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an interesting point that the vote gap between national and local elections is decreasing, 
and local elections have become more important and competitive especially for the 
urban dwellers. This observation signifies that the influence of the two institutional 
setting variables (election type and electoral system) is fading, while socioeconomic 
factors have become more dominant in the voting motivation of people. What, then, 
about the third institutional setting variable, the influence of compulsory voting? 
 
In the study, it is seen that after the adoption of compulsory voting in 1982, voter 
turnout increased significantly in Turkey. This observation supports the work of 
Lijphart suggesting the application of compulsory voting as a solution for the low 
electoral participation problem of the USA. Moreover, it endorses the assumption of the 
rational choice theory that as the cost of not voting increases, voter turnout increases. 
On the other hand, as outlined in the thesis, in practice the sanction on a failure in 
voting is not being applied because cost of sending the notification exceeds the value of 
the fine. Then why do Turkish people intend to vote in a higher proportion then do other 
Western European citizens?  
 
The answer to this question is again related to the intervention of Turkish army in 
the democracy process. Franklin points out that as the salience of the elections 
increases; this motivates the electorates to cast a vote in the elections. The salience of 
the elections is determined by the institutional motivations such as electoral system, 
compulsory voting, and frequency of the elections, competitiveness, as well as weekend 
voting. In Turkey, the institutional setting design for national elections supports 
Franklin’s assumptions for every point. Elections are held on Sunday, use proportional 
representative electoral system, adopt compulsory voting, are highly competitive, and 
made less frequently. Hence, it can be claimed that the reason for relatively high 
electoral participation in Turkey as compared to those of other Western countries lies in 
its institutional design. On the other hand, this thesis study indicates that besides the 
institutional design of Turkish elections, the intervention of military into the politics 
raises the significance of the elections for the Turkish citizens as well.  However in 
order to prove this assumption of the thesis, individual-level interviews with the Turkish 
electorates, and a comparative study examining the other countries that experienced 
military coups is necessary.  
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Lastly, merging the data of national and local elections within the same dataset 
also enables this study to observe the relationship between these elections. As it is 
expected voter turnout in national elections is higher than the local elections. However, 
the study argues that there is a similar pattern of fluctuations for voter turnout in 
Turkish national and local elections, in which a national election experiences a low 
participation, so does the following local election. This situation again indicates that not 
only the election type differences, but the current socioeconomic and political events 
determine the level of participation to elections. Additionally this scenario demonstrates 
that casting a vote is a political action in which citizens have the opportunity to reflect 
their discontent or satisfaction from the government. Voting in a way is a tool for 
communication. The high level of volatility and fragmentation in Turkish national and 
local elections also indicates that there is a similar pattern between national and local 
elections and that not party preferences but the performance of the governments 
(especially economical) determines the voting behavior of the electorates.  
 
Referring to Powell’s study, this thesis questions the linkage between electoral 
participation rate-electoral system-party system-degree of democracy; furthermore this 
research reveals that not the level of participation rate but the functioning of party 
system, the number of effective parties, volatility and fragmentation index levels all 
determine the degree of democracy in a country. Although Turkey has a high electoral 
participation rate, Turkish political structure is fragile, open to the emergence of and 
favors of extremist parties and has problems in constructing a consolidated democracy 
due to high level of volatility and fragmentation which has mainly occurred as a result 
of military interventions.  
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              APPENDIX A- Dataset Province Level (1977 and 1999) 
 
 
ELECTIONS 
Election 
Years 
Electoral 
Participation 
Rate 
Size of 
Population
Size of 
Population 
(log) 
Illiteracy 
Rate (age 
6 and 
over) 
GNP per 
capita 
(log) 
GNP 
per 
capita 
in $ 
Growth 
in GNP 
per 
capita 
Election 
type 
Electoral 
System 
Compulsory 
Voting 
Number 
of 
Parties  
Number of 
Parties 
(log) Competitiveness 
1950 National 
Election 1950 89,3 20947000 7,321 67,49 2,22 166,4 6,9 1 0 0 3 0,477 13,3 
1954 National 
Election 1954 88,6 23204000 7,366 59,01 2,39 244,9 -5,6 1 0 0 4 0,602 22,21 
1957 National 
Election 1957 76,6 25250000 7,402 59,01 2,62 414,5 4,4 1 0 0 4 0,602 6,79 
1961 National 
Election 1961 81,4 28227000 7,451 60,49 2,29 194,1 -0,6 1 1 0 4 0,602 1,94 
1963 Mayor of 
Municipality 
Election 1963 69,3 29652000 7,472 51,24 2,40 249,2 7 0 0 0 6 0,778 9,73 
1963 Members 
of Provincial 
Council 
Elections 1963 77,6 29652000 7,472 51,24 2,40 249,2 7 0 1 0 6 0,778 9,26 
1965 National 
Election 1965 71,3 31391000 7,497 51,24 2,43 271,3 0,6 1 1 0 6 0,778 24,12 
1968 Mayor of 
Municipality 
Election 1968 59,4 33586000 7,526 43,79 2,73 537,4 4,1 0 0 0 8 0,903 15,63 
1968 Members 
of Provincial 
Council 
Elections 1968 65,7 33586000 7,526 43,79 2,73 537,4 4,1 0 1 0 8 0,903 21,12 
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1969 National 
Election 1969 64,3 34443000 7,537 43,79 2,77 586,3 1,7 1 1 0 8 0,903 19,51 
1973 National 
Election 1973 66,8 38073000 7,581 36,28 2,87 734,1 2,3 1 1 0 8 0,903 3,47 
1973 Mayor of 
Municipality 
Election 1973 56 38073000 7,581 36,28 2,87 734,1 2,3 0 0 0 8 0,903 9,07 
1973 Members 
of Provincial 
Council 
Elections 1973 61,7 38073000 7,581 36,28 2,87 734,1 2,3 0 1 0 8 0,903 4,77 
1977 National 
Election 1977 72,4 41769000 7,621 32,52 3,17 1466,8 0,9 1 1 0 8 0,903 4,5 
1977 Mayor of 
Municipality 
Election 1977 53,1 41769000 7,621 32,52 3,17 1466,8 0,9 0 0 0 10 1,000 11,57 
1977 Members 
of Provincial 
Council 
Elections 1977 60,4 41769000 7,621 32,52 3,17 1466,8 0,9 0 1 0 10 1,000 4,63 
1983 National 
Election 1983 92,3 47864000 7,680 22,55 3,10 1263,8 1,7 1 1 1 3 0,477 14,68 
1984 Mayor of 
Municipality 
Election 1984 85,6 49070000 7,691 22,55 3,08 1204,4 4,5 0 0 1 6 0,778 18,39 
1984 Members 
of Provincial 
Council 
Elections 1984 91 49070000 7,691 22,55 3,08 1204,4 4,5 0 1 1 6 0,778 18,17 
1987 National 
Election 1987 93,3 52561000 7,721 19,51 3,21 1635,8 7,5 1 1 1 7 0,845 11,57 
1989 Mayor of 
Municipality 
Election 1989 78 54893000 7,740 19,51 3,29 1959,2 -0,6 0 0 1 7 0,845 9,02 
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1989 Members 
of Provincial 
Council 
Elections 1989 81,5 54893000 7,740 19,51 3,29 1959,2 -0,6 0 1 1 7 0,845 3,56 
1991 National 
Election 1991 83,9 57262000 7,758 20,1 3,42 2621 -0,16 1 1 1 6 0,778 3,02 
1994 Mayor of 
Municipality 
Election 1994 90,5 60612000 7,783 15,6 3,34 2184 -7,8 0 0 1 13 1,114 3,9 
1994 Members 
of Provincial 
Council 
Elections 1994 92,2 60612000 7,783 15,6 3,34 2184 -7,8 0 1 1 13 1,114 0,32 
1995 National 
Election 1995 85,2 61737000 7,791 14,8 3,44 2759 6,1 1 1 1 12 1,079 1,73 
1999 National 
Election 1999 87,1 66293000 7,821 13,7 3,46 2879 -7,4 1 1 1 20 1,301 4,21 
1999 Mayor of 
Municipality 
Election 1999 85,2 66293000 7,821 13,7 3,46 2879 -7,4 0 0 1 20 1,301 0,97 
1999 Members 
of Provincial 
Council 
Elections 1999 86,9 66293000 7,821 13,7 3,46 2879 -7,4 0 1 1 20 1,301 1,53 
2002 National 
Election 2002 79,1 66626000 7,824 12,5 3,41 2584 6,2 1 1 1 18 1,255 15,02 
2004 Mayor of 
Municipality 
Election 2004 71,7 71789000 7,856 12,6 3,62 4172 6,6 0 0 1 20 1,301 19,25 
2004 Members 
of Provincial 
Council 
Elections 2004 75,3 71789000 7,856 12,6 3,62 4172 6,6 0 1 1 20 1,301 23,51 
2007 National 
Election 2007 84,3 73429426 7,866   3,70 5008 7 1 1 1 14 1,146 25,81 
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APPENDIX B- Vote Shares of Parties in National Elections (1950-2002) and in Local Elections (1963-2004) 
 
 
                               NATIONAL ELECTIONS                                                                                MAYOR of MUNICIPALITY ELECTIONS 
 1950 1954 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002   1963 1968 1973 1977 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 
Party                          
Justice Party 
(AP)  34,60 52,90 46,60 29,8 36,9         45,39 46,79 33,35 36,43      
Republican 
People's 
Party (CHP) 39,6 35,1 41,40 36,70 28,70 27,40 33,30 41,40    10,70 8,7 19,4   35,66 31,16 42,42 48   4,36 13,83 20,88 
Republican 
Peasant's 
Nationalist 
Party 
(CKMP)   14,00 2,20            1,38 1,01        
Republican 
Reliance 
Party (CGP)     6,60 5,3 1,9          3,09 1,19 0,44      
Republican 
Nationalist 
Party (CMP)  5,3 6,50                      
Democratic 
Party (DP)     11,9 1,8           6,18 0,66      
Freedom 
Party (HP)  3,50                       
Nation Party 
(MP) 4,60    6,30 3,2 0,6    0,5 0,3 0,2   2,71 1,86 0,10       
Turkish 
Labor Party 
(TİP) 0   3 2,70           0,73 2,08        
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New Turkey 
Party (YTP) 0 13,70 3,70 2,20        1,2   3,57 0,45        
Independents 0,60 0,6 0 0,80 3,20 5,60 2,8 2,5 1,1 0,4 0,1 0,5 0,9 1   10,56 12,52 12,09 5,02 3,14 1,30 0,78 0,65 0,95 
Justice and 
Development 
Party (AKP)       34,3           40,13 
Union Party 
(BP)           0,2           0,16  
Young Party 
(GP)             7,2           2,35 
Democrat 
Party (DP) 55,2 58,4 48,60        0,3          0,32 0,13 0,02 
Nationalist 
Action Party 
(MHP)     3,00 3,4 6,4    8,2 18 8,4     0,74 3,94   7,51 15,14 10,13 
National 
Salvation 
Party (MSP)     11,8 8,6      3,89 4,76      
Turkish 
Union Party 
(TBP)     2,80 1,1 0,4           0,03 0,13      
People's 
Democracy 
Party 
(HADEP)        4,2 4,7           3,37  
Socialist 
Rule Party 
(SİP)            0,1           0,03  
Motherland 
Party 
(ANAP)         45,1 36,3 24 19,6 13,2 5,1       43,24 23,74 22,97 17,43 2,96 
Democratic 
People's 
Party 
(DEHAP)         6,2            
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True Path 
Party (DYP)         19,1 27 19,2 12 9,5       11,80 23,48 18,90 12,75 9,47 
Populist 
Party (HP)        30,5            7,78     
Nationalist 
Democracy 
Party (MDP)         23,3            5,45     
Democratic 
Left Party 
(DSP)          8,5 10,8 14,6 22,2 1,2        6,46 7,87 15,19 1,95 
Reformist 
Democracy 
Party (IDP)          0,8           0,50   
Nationalist 
Work Party 
(MCP)          2,9           3,02   
Social 
Democrat 
Populist 
Party (SHP)          24,8 20,8          32,76 16,70  4,66 
BBP            1,5 1         0,94 1,22 0,62 
Labor Party 
(İP)            0,2 0,2 0,5         0,16 0,09 0,11 
Rebirth 
Party (YDP)            0,3 0,1          0,17 0,06  
Independent 
Turkey 
Party (BTP)             0,5           0,30 
Liberal 
Democrat 
Party (LDP)             0,4 0,3          0,09  
Freedom and 
Solidarity 
Party (ODP)             0,8 0,3          0,48 0,10 
Felicity 
Party (SP)             2,5           4,81 
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Turkey 
Communist 
Party (TKP)             0,2           0,10 
Country 
Party (YP)             0,9            
Democracy 
and Peace 
Party (DBP)             0,1           0,01  
Democratic 
Turkey 
Party (DTP)             0,3           0,71  
DEPAR             0,1           0,02  
Labor Party 
(EMEP)             0,2          0,09 0,10  
Virtue Party 
(FP)             15,4           18,40  
Welfare 
Party (RP)          7,2 16,9 21,4         3,75 8,74 19,07   
SP            0,4              
New Party 
(YP)             0,1             
(New 
Democracy 
Movement) 
YDH             0,5             
Social 
Democracy 
Party 
(SODEP)                      24,85     
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                                                                APPENDIX C- Dataset Nation-wide Level (1950-2004) 
 
 
Province 
Voter 
Turnout 
Nat-1977 
Voter 
Turnout 
Mayor-
1977 
Voter 
Turnout 
Member-
1977 
Voter 
Turnout 
Nat-1999 
Voter 
Turnout 
Mayor-
1999 
Voter 
Turnout 
Member-
1999 
Proportion of 
Urban 
Population 
1975 
Proportion 
of Urban 
Population 
2000 
GNP per 
capita 1977 
(with 87 
prices) 
GNP per 
capita 1977 
(with 87 
prices) 
(log) 
GNP per 
capita 1999 
(with 87 
prices) 
GNP per 
capita 
1999 (with 
87 prices) 
(log) 
Marma
ra & 
Aegean 
Region 
Illiteracy 
Rate 
1975 
Illiteracy 
Rate 
2000 
Adana    68,7 47,7 57 83,8 81,7 83,6 57 75,58 1.352.957 6,13 1981184 6,30 0 0,34 13,12 
Adıyaman 75,4 64,4 71,2 87,9 84,2 86,1 29 54,33 484,806 2,69 767609 5,89 0 0,22 20,11 
Afyon    73 66,5 .Missing 93,3 92,4 93,3 29 45,77 797,835 2,90 955911 5,98 1 0,39 11,73 
Ağrı     76,4 53,9 73,3 81,7 75,8 81,5 28 47,72 409,158 2,61 368016 5,57 0 0,54 32,02 
Amasya   81,1 69 75,4 89,6 87,7 89,5 36 53,83 850,923 2,93 1180757 6,07 0 0,38 12,59 
Ankara   70,7 44,5 49,5 88,4 87,7 88,4 77 88,34 1.314.266 6,12 2224013 6,35 0 0,22 6,72 
Antalya  79,5 66,5 78,7 85,4 82,6 85,7 33 54,45 940,359 2,97 1757983 6,25 0 0,33 7,92 
Artvin  73,3 63,4 65,9 86,6 85,3 86,9 19 43,87 938,31 2,97 1691097 6,23 0 0,35 13,16 
Aydın    79,3 66,4 71,5 91,3 89,1 90,5 35 51,87 1.228.182 6,09 1771720 6,25 1 0,34 12,56 
Balıkesir 80,1 61,5 76,6 91,1 88,4 90,9 37 53,66 1.183.273 6,07 1574544 6,20 1 0,3 11,63 
Bilecik  80,9 70,9 74,9 93,8 91,4 93,4 34 64,01 1.234.767 6,09 2914285 6,46 1 0,29 8,44 
Bingöl   74 64,2 68,3 84,2 80,7 84,1 22 48,66 399.887 5,60 462617 5,67 0 0,53 26,38 
Bitlis   84,1 63 70,6 86,8 84 86,7 35 56,48 553.547 5,74 414902 5,62 0 0,63 27,57 
Bolu     76,7 60,3 73 92,1 89,7 92 25 52,72 1.037.013 6,02 1749764 6,24 0 0,32 10,36 
Burdur   76,4 75,6 75,4 94,5 93,4 94,5 32 54,48 1.076.792 6,03 1629687 6,21 0 0,33 10,28 
Bursa    74,4 52,4 60 89,9 88,8 89,9 53 76,75 1.589.674 6,20 2250911 6,35 1 0,29 8,27 
Çanakkale 83,4 70,9 77,1 92,3 89,4 92,3 29 46,36 1.228.755 6,09 2013041 6,30 1 0,3 10,44 
Çankırı 74,5 66,6 72,9 90 90 89,9 24 52,22 674.267 5,83 890455 5,95 0 0,38 11,82 
Çorum    77,9 62,9 70,8 91,8 90,4 91,7 27 52,24 798.611 5,90 1391099 6,14 0 0,46 16,88 
Denizli  77,1 73,8 66,3 92,1 90,6 92 30 48,69 1.008.317 6,00 2050668 6,31 1 0,35 10,43 
Diyarbakır 66,5 43,8 58,7 79,4 74,9 79,2 43 60 755.238 5,88 888308 5,95 0 0,59 30,41 
Edirne   77 57,9 69,6 91,3 88,7 91,2 39 57,35 1.272.938 6,10 1715420 6,23 1 0,28 10,96 
 116
Elazığ 68,7 52,3 56,9 83,2 80,3 82,8 42 63,95 951.809 5,98 1221049 6,09 0 0,43 17,68 
Erzincan 71,3 58,6 61,8 83,2 82,3 83,3 30 54,35 830.250 5,92 885224 5,95 0 0,38 12,81 
Erzurum  80 61 90,3 80 81,5 84,3 33 59,8 681.718 5,83 636472 5,80 0 0,47 16,36 
Eskişehir 75 54,6 57,8 92,1 91,4 91,9 59 78,9 1.425.786 6,15 2005663 6,30 0 0,23 7,04 
Gaziantep  68,9 61,6 58,6 84,5 82,3 84,3 53 78,52 1.015.256 6,01 1351161 6,13 0 0,45 16,22 
Giresun  66,9 61,7 62 86,2 84,4 86,1 24 54,09 869.376 5,94 1098666 6,04 0 0,44 16,64 
Gümüşhane 67 60,7 59,3 84,7 84,7 84,7 16 41,49 510.832 5,71 800219 5,90 0 0,42 13,59 
Hakkâri  80 69,7 76,9 85,8 82,8 85,7 24 58,95 422.444 5,63 275000 5,44 0 0,74 29,31 
Hatay    75,1 57 63,8 87,1 85,7 87,1 42 46,37 851.747 5,93 1486942 6,17 0 0,42 13,98 
Isparta 77,8 65,4 63,9 92,8 91,8 92,6 35 58,71 904.229 5,96 1210160 6,08 0 0,3 7,99 
İçel     66 52,2 61,7 84,2 82,7 84,9 47 60,51 1.555.772 6,19 1885485 6,28 0 0,3 10,84 
İstanbul 64,4 37 38,6 83,8 82,5 82,6 68 90,69 2.696.323 6,43 2528842 6,40 1 0,2 6,61 
İzmir    78,5 58,6 62 87,5 86,8 87,4 54 81,07 1.820.759 6,26 2612373 6,42 1 0,23 8,14 
Kars     73,6 61,7 71,3 81,6 76,9 82 24 43,73 539.641 5,73 584394 5,77 0 0,46 17,05 
Kastamonu 73,9 58,4 68,9 90,1 87,7 89,9 20 46,35 861.471 5,94 1367224 6,14 0 0,47 19,20 
Kayseri  70,5 57,6 59,5 87,7 86,8 87,6 43 69,06 981.022 5,99 1288844 6,11 0 0,34 11,11 
Kırklareli 81,4 69,6 74,4 92,1 90,4 92 40 57,6 1.315.351 6,12 2640965 6,42 1 0,24 7,12 
Kırşehir 66 55 64 89,5 88,3 89,3 30 58,21 872.945 5,94 1117793 6,05 0 0,41 12,48 
Kocaeli  68,5 47,7 54,7 87,7 88,7 87,5 53 59,94 3.373.588 6,53 3815648 6,58 1 0,25 7,95 
Konya    69,2 61,3 62,3 91,3 90,4 91 39 59,07 986.230 5,99 1222669 6,09 0 0,33 9,92 
Kütahya  80 60,8 65,9 93,3 91,9 93,3 29 48,54 1.041.252 6,02 1302902 6,11 1 0,37 10,91 
Malatya  68,3 51 58,6 83,6 80,7 79,7 38 58,54 751.359 5,88 994900 6,00 0 0,42 14,65 
Manisa   81,3 67,3 72,4 92,3 90,6 92,2 39 56,72 1.238.009 6,09 2410918 6,38 1 0,36 13,71 
K.Maraş  74 58,4 .Missing 87,1 84,2 86,1 65 53,47 595.150 5,77 1061936 6,03 0 0,48 16,57 
Mardin   78,1 65,7 70,6 84,2 79,7 83,9 30 55,49 607.938 5,78 726609 5,86 0 0,64 28,78 
Muğla    80,3 72,1 78,3 90,4 87 89,9 21 37,51 968.095 5,99 2366215 6,37 1 0,31 7,26 
Muş      81,6 55 76 81,5 78,8 81,8 20 35,16 598.527 5,78 387825 5,59 0 0,61 30,55 
Nevşehir 71 66,1 61,8 91,7 90,7 91,9 27 44,05 1.076.782 6,03 1731618 6,24 0 0,42 11,58 
Niğde    67,3 65,5 63,7 89,2 88,6 88,9 23 36,43 804.415 5,91 1430586 6,16 0 0,65 13,73 
Ordu     69,2 63 67,8 84,7 82,7 84,6 22 46,93 610.717 5,79 915305 5,96 0 0,5 16,88 
Rize     69,7 59,5 54,9 81,9 80,1 81,8 24 56,09 1.037.778 6,02 1460357 6,16 0 0,39 12,30 
Sakarya  76,5 61 66,5 89,6 87,8 89,5 35 60,81 1.142.053 6,06 1641539 6,22 1 0,32 9,15 
Samsun   72,6 61,4 69,9 84,9 84,5 87 32 52,54 943.657 5,97 1462835 6,17 0 0,43 13,79 
Siirt    74,6 61,6 71,9 84,5 83,8 84,3 39 58,22 730.134 5,86 723130 5,86 0 0,66 31,34 
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Sinop    71,6 68,6 71,15 88,1 86,1 88,1 20 44,9 641.146 5,81 1121036 6,05 0 0,45 17,28 
Sivas    74,4 60,6 64,2 85,4 84,9 85,3 32 55,86 625.085 5,80 1037859 6,02 0 0,44 14,60 
Tekirdağ 79,5 62,7 70,6 90,2 86,8 88,7 43 63,4 1.261.154 6,10 2492844 6,40 1 0,59 6,99 
Tokat    79,9 69 73,1 86,8 85,7 87 30 48,52 705.405 5,85 1112898 6,05 0 0,43 14,32 
Trabzon  64 53,8 52,9 83,3 81,2 82,8 24 49,12 697.436 5,84 1097053 6,04 0 0,41 11,51 
Tunceli  68,8 67,3 59,5 82,4 79,7 82,2 21 58,21 497.767 5,70 815342 5,91 0 0,64 16,97 
Urfa     69,4 47,8 Missing 85,9 79,1 85,5 44 58,34 717.587 5,86 806085 5,91 0 0,64 32,23 
Uşak     73,7 63,5 67,6 91,6 91,9 93,6 38 56,48 844.585 5,93 1252577 6,10 1 0,4 12,46 
Van      80,3 61,1 74,4 81,1 77,2 81 30 50,94 447.012 5,65 505495 5,70 0 0,68 31,94 
Yozgat   71,3 63,2 69,6 90 88,6 89,7 22 46,15 584.455 5,77 730973 5,86 0 0,45 13,82 
Zonguldak 71,9 51,5 65 88,9 86,1 89 31 40,66 1.626.492 6,21 1530876 6,18 0 0,37 12,18 
Aksaray  . . . 87,3 86 87,2   50,55     831056 5,92 0   13,66 
Bayburt  . . . 82,6 80,1 82,6   42,48     626799 5,80 0   13,49 
Karaman  . . . 93 92,1 92,9   57,53     1780616 6,25 0   10,28 
Kırıkkale . . . 88,5 88 88,7   74,39     1894035 6,28 0   10,87 
Batman   . . . 85,1 83,2 85   66,6     915995 5,96 0   29,02 
Şırnak   . . . 83 82,2 83   59,83     356676 5,55 0   34,24 
Bartın   . . . 90,6 88 90,5   26,06     678187 5,83 0   15,97 
Ardahan  . . . 83,9 78,6 83,8   29,7     520604 5,72 0   15,37 
Iğdır    . . . 81,9 77,5 81,6   48,38     591538 5,77 0   24,52 
Karabük  . . . 91,2 90 91   70,08     3399146 6,53 0   7,07 
Kilis    . . . 89,6 87,1 89,6   65,36     3453645 6,54 0   13,06 
Yalova   . . . 84,9 83,9 84,85   58,52     1637957 6,21 1   19,55 
Osmaniye . . . 85,2 85,2 85,1   68     852840 5,93 0   13,98 
 
 
Note: The values of the dummy variables (election type, electoral system and compulsory voting) are not included to the dataset.  
           Election type: 1 for national, 0 for local (mayor of municipality and members of provincial council) elections. 
           Electoral system: 1 for national and members of provincial council; and 0 for mayor of municipality elections. 
          Compulsory voting: 1 for all the elections after 1980, and 0 for all the elections before 1980.  
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